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 Abstract 
 
Considerable risk is present in today’s ranching world; especially price and production 
risk. A producer who can tolerate more risk, and is knowledgeable about how to effectively 
manage price and production risk, may have opportunity to increase profitability relative to a 
highly risk averse producer. The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions and sources of 
risk, identify how risk management is conducted, assess price and production risks, and view 
differences between producers’ perceptions versus their attitudes towards risk and factors that 
affect risk. In order to investigate cow-calf producers’ perceptions of risk, an instrument was 
created to survey beef cow-calf producers in the Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA). Respondents provided information on their production practices, marketing methods, 
operating decisions and risk related to their cow-calf operations. A risk preference score for 
individual producers was developed from specific survey questions to determine three 
objectives: to classify producers’ risk preferences related to their operating decisions; determine 
operating decisions that affect risk preferences; and identify what production and marketing 
practices in which producers were willing to risk for a chance to increase the net returns to their 
operations. 
A bi-directional causality between risk aversion and operation characteristics was 
illustrated between how operating decisions are related to risk aversion, and risk aversion is 
related to operating decisions. Factors that were found to influence risk aversion were 
socioeconomic factors such as age, off-farm income, debt-to-asset ratio, farm size, and number 
of cows owned, as well as comparative advantages of producer’s: use and analysis of new 
technology, business planning skills and marketing skills. Models showing how risk aversion 
 was related to production management focused on producer’s financial soundness, production 
practices and marketing methods, specific to retained ownership.  Producers who would 
participate in value-added programs to increase returns to their operation have a comparative 
advantage in marketing skills, own more cattle, and are less diversified in terms of their farm 
enterprise incomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1– Background 
New York Times best-selling author, H. Jackson Brown, Jr. said, “If your life is free of 
failures, you're not taking enough risks.” Brown’s excerpt relates well to cattle operations and it 
can appropriately be restated as, “If your cow-calf operation is free of failures, you’re not taking 
enough risks to potentially increase returns.”  Considerable risk is present in today’s ranching 
world; especially marketing, financial (price) and production risk. A producer who can tolerate 
more risk, and is knowledgeable about how to effectively manage these risks, may have 
opportunity to increase profitability relative to a highly risk averse producer. For example, 
retaining ownership of calves increases profit potential, but also increases risk for the cow-calf 
producer.  Both cow-calf input and output prices vary as market conditions change. Recent years 
have seen particularly elevated price risk for cow-calf producers. How producers perceive and 
react to risks they face can have substantial impacts on the viability of cow-calf operations, as 
well as separating the achievers from the failures who are not taking adequate risks.  
Thus, a producer who is highly risk averse may avoid taking risks, thus, limiting the 
operations growth potential. However, taking unjustified large risks can place an entire operation 
in financial peril. Understanding risk aversion levels of cow-calf producers, what drives their 
level of risk preference or aversion, and how risk preferences affect producer decision making is 
critical when designing information systems, education programs, and risk management tools to 
meet producer needs.   
When producers take an unjustified large risk, they may hit it big, or could plummet into 
the red very quickly. Even though Brown said you are not taking enough risks if your life [cattle 
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operation] is free of failures, the producer’s preference and current financial situation is also 
likely an important factor affecting risk tolerance. Some producers may prefer higher levels of 
risk by retaining ownership of their calves through processing. Others may want to retain 
ownership, or are willing to retain ownership of their calves, however the opportunity for them is 
not possible because they are not part of a marketing program specific to retained ownership. 
Therefore, they are viewed as preferring less risk because they do not participate in a retained 
ownership program. Others may be very risk averse and take the easy road, which hardly ever 
gives them the chance to earn the possible higher income they could if they were willing to 
accept more risk.  
Price risk is present for cow-calf producers even before the first calf is born. The cost of 
replacements and breeding stock can be a large price risk. Price risk continues after calves hit the 
ground depending on if the producer decides to sell calves at weaning and the current feeder 
price. If the producer decides to retain ownership of calves through processing, they have to 
worry about carcass rail price risk. Producers can potentially limit profit volatility through 
utilization of price risk management strategies such as forward contracting, hedging, or 
Livestock Risk Protection Insurance (LRP).  
Production risks are initiated with a line-up of input costs: pasture rent or ownership, 
forage and grain prices (especially in a volatile economy), animal health, fuel, labor, interest, and 
maintenance costs. Production risks are not only driven by production costs, but by factors such 
as severe weather, changes in environmental or other government policies and programs, animal 
disease prevention, and credit availability. Producers can also have a form of self-insurance to 
manage their production risks by carrying inventories, diversification, maintaining financial 
reserves, or off-farm income. The way a producer chooses to manage price and production risks 
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reveals their tolerance for business risk. Understanding a producer’s risk preference in their cow-
calf operation and what drives this preference is where this research will be critical to provide 
information on how to produce profitably in the future. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions and sources of risk, identify how 
risk management is conducted, assess price and production risks, and view differences between 
producers’ perceptions versus their attitudes towards risk and factors that affect risk. This will 
provide information to educational institutions and allow for the data set to be used for 
supplementary research in the future.  Notably, this research is conducted and analyzed to allow 
cow-calf producers to see how their operating decisions compare to their risk preference as an 
opportunity related to profit margins. In order to investigate cow-calf producers’ perceptions of 
risk, an instrument was created to survey beef cow-calf producers in the Kansas Farm 
Management Association (KFMA).  
1.2 – Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to quantify cow-calf producers’ risk perceptions and 
associated determinants. Specifically, the research objectives are: 
1. Determine cow-calf producer risk preferences based on a set of risk aversion 
measurements.  
2. Determine how operating decisions producers are making based on their production and 
marketing practices specific to calf-timing, health management, feeding and grazing, 
breeding, culling, and selling are related to their risk aversion. 
3. Determine how risk aversion affects producer management and marketing practices.  
4. Identify what production and marketing practices that might increase risk producers are 
willing to change for a chance to increase the net returns to their operations. 
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In order to accomplish these goals, a survey instrument was developed and mailed to 
KFMA members who reported owning cows in 2008.  The purpose of the instrument was to 
obtain information to better understand risk aversion levels of producers and how risk aversion 
affects business decisions, and to identify determinants of risk preferences.  This information is 
intended to assist in the development of education programs, and risk management tools to 
enhance cow-calf producers’ risk management decisions and potentially improve profitability in 
their cattle operations.   
1.3 – Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2 is a review of previous studies 
regarding the development of risk preference instruments and risk preferences of cow-calf 
producers. It also contains reviews of articles that discuss characteristics of risk-taking 
individuals and analysis of risk management in agriculture. Chapter 3 is devoted to data sources, 
summary statistics and results from the survey instrument. Definitions of the variables used are 
also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 4 determines and describes the risk preference score. 
Additionally, model specifications and results are reported for operating decisions related to risk 
aversion. In addition, sensitivity analysis is presented with producer financial soundness, 
production practices, and marketing methods specific to retained ownership. Chapter 5 sets up 
model specifications and results for risk aversion related to operating decisions and models are 
compared in three categories: producer financial soundness, production practices and marketing 
methods specific to retained ownership. Chapter 6 provides models and results to identify what 
production and marketing methods producers are willing to change or willing to risk to increase 
their returns. Finally, Chapter 7 reports conclusions collected from this study and discusses 
suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 -  Literature Review 
2.1 – Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review literature related to constructing risk survey 
instruments, cow-calf production and price risk, and risk preferences. There is extensive 
literature on financial risk tolerance that evaluates dimensions of risk scoring. The following 
section reviews these dimensions as well as findings of research studying risk preferences in the 
cow-calf industry. 
2.2 – Defining Risk in Cow-Calf Operations 
Two terms will be used frequently in the following analysis: risk aversion and risk 
preference. Risk aversion can be described as the tendency to prefer any sure outcome over any 
gamble (Slovic, 1977). Risk preference is the tendency to prefer a gamble over any sure 
outcome.  This research specifically explores risk preference as an opportunity for producers to 
increase net returns. As MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985) establish that even within the most 
highly developed theory of risk, the determination of a person’s risk tendency is not definite. The 
same goes with this research; it is not aiming to determine the direct attitudinal behaviors of 
Kansas cattle producers. Rather, it is taking preferences denoted by Kansas cattle producers and 
using them, leveraged with their whole farm data, to try and show possible systems in which 
their risk preference is related to their operating decisions, and vice versa.  
There are three main attitudinal views a producer can have towards risk (Hardaker, 
2004).  A risk averse producer is an individual who prefers an investment with a lower, but 
certain, expected payoff to an investment with a higher, but uncertain, payoff. A risk neutral 
producer is an individual who cares only about the expected payoff of an investment and not the 
risk that must be taken to achieve the investment goal.  This type of producer will neither 
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instinctively take risks nor pay to elude them. A risk preferring producer is an individual who 
actively engages in risky investments with a high, but uncertain, payoff. 
2.2.1 – Cow-Calf Price and Production Risk 
Cow-calf producers have a myriad of price and production risks, starting when the calf 
hits the ground until that calf is weaned and ready to sell or be fed.  Operation risks can include 
land and maintenance costs, cost of breeding stock, and veterinarian bills.  Cattle prices are 
subject to seasonal fluctuations.  Many producers do not consider their risk options when it 
comes to marketing and selling their weaned calves, and these cattle producers who market their 
output in the cash market experience fluctuations in gross incomes due to changing market 
prices, known as price risks, as well as changes in output quantity caused by environmental 
factors, known as production risk (Murphy, 1991).  
Production risks are considerable as well as important; most producers are more familiar 
with how to handle production risk, than they are with handling price risk. When it comes to 
price risk, many producers have less confidence in the outcome of their choices, or have a lack of 
understanding of strategies available for managing price risks. Murphy (1991) suggests three 
ways cow-calf producers can manage their price risks: 1) reducing herd size, 2) shifting to a 
controlled breeding season, and 3) maintaining ownership of calves through stocker and /or 
feedlot stages.  
2.2.2 – Risk-Return Tradeoff 
Murphy’s study also mentions the tradeoff between risk and return. Some operators may 
be more willing to sacrifice expected income to keep income variation at a low level (risk 
averse), whereas others may be willing to accept more variation in income provided expected 
income is higher (risk preferring). Risk preference is also influenced by a number of 
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socioeconomic characteristics of the producer, including age, wealth, and other factors (Murphy, 
1991; Grable, 1999; Morin, 1983).  
2.2.3 – Risk Factors 
Areas of research for this study were broken into two categories: production and 
marketing factors. Within the production factor category, areas of breeding, calving, culling, 
comparative advantages and managing input costs and volatility were researched and put into 
question form on the survey. Within the marketing factor category, areas of selling after 
weaning, backgrounding, retaining ownership through finishing and marketing and pricing 
methods were also researched and put into question form on the survey.  
Production and marketing factors were looked at through previous survey research to 
develop questions that would provide us with relevant information. Hall (2003) surveyed 
respondents on perceptions and sources of risk, risk management tools, and risk factors that 
affect farm/ranch income. Schroeder (2003) surveyed cattle feeders on marketing agreements 
and alliances, as well as pricing methods. Risk questions are discussed in the next section. 
2.3 – Construction of an instrument 
In order to prepare an efficient risk survey instrument, different methods and research 
approaches were studied. Grable and Lytton (1999) understood the need for a widely accepted 
and commonly used instrument for researchers of all kinds to understand financial risk tolerance.  
Research to comprehend risk tolerance has been studied for years (Bernstein, 1996), but 
recognizing and developing trends among agricultural decision makers is a newer area of 
interest. Grable and Lytton (1999) used MacCrimmon and Wehrung’s (1985) research to 
categorize the risk-tolerance assessment instrument to include five elements: 1) some central 
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concept of risk, 2) allowance for the derivation of a risk measure, 3) relevance to respondents, 4) 
ease of administration, and 5) adequate validity and reliability. 
Similarly, Babbie (1983) recommended that an instrument be created by 1) selecting 
items for an instrument, 2) conducting an item analysis, 3) creating index scores, and 4) testing 
for index and instrument validity and reliability. These elements were considered when 
classifying questions which assume multidimensional areas of risk.  Using several dimensions of 
risk are important in a survey to find the respondents true attitude toward their form of risk 
preference. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985) determined in their study that they could not 
label someone as a risk-taker or a risk-averter by only observing his or her behavior in a single 
situation. Therefore, the dimensions of risk narrowed down from Grable’s work for this study 
were: 1) guaranteed vs. probable gambles, 2) speculative risk, 3) choice between sure loss and 
sure gain, 4) risk as experience and knowledge, and 5) risk as a level of comfort. The following 
discussion briefly describes these methods.  
The first dimension, guaranteed vs. probable gambles, requires the respondent to make 
risk calculations. This dimension offers a respondent a guaranteed safe option with a 
corresponding probable gain. Therefore, a respondent who chooses a gamble over the guaranteed 
return should be considered more risk tolerant.  
The second dimension, speculative risk, assumes that a respondent who has a greater 
tendency to speculate is more risk tolerant in terms of their finances than others. This dimension 
combines different aspects of risk preference by allowing the respondent to choose between a 
safe course of action, or speculate on the degree of return offered by a situation.  Usually, a 
respondent who elects to forego higher rates of return in pursuit of stability or sure gains are 
considered to be less risk tolerant than others.  
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The third dimension, choice between sure loss and sure gain, is measured by setting up a 
question that requires a respondent to choose among alternatives without complete information. 
Risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to feel a sense of satisfaction when they earn money by 
taking some sort of action where absolute information is given. Obviously, a sure gain is more 
attractive to a producer than a sure loss; however, a sure loss, in theory, is a smaller loss. The 
loss may be smaller than what the producer would gain, thus the producer would rather lose 
some, than lose it all.  
The fourth dimension, risk as experience and knowledge, requires some degree of 
expertise or knowledge to answer specific questions. This dimension is shown as functional 
because if experience and knowledge are positively related to risk tolerance, a respondent who 
answers aggressively to these items should generally be more risk tolerant than others.  
Lastly, risk as a level of comfort, assesses the respondents’ attitude towards risk 
preference. This is highly related to expertise and knowledge. Risk tolerant respondents are 
likely to feel confidence and satisfaction when making a risky choice; less risk tolerant 
respondents will tend to shy away from taking risks.  
 Thus, five risk questions were created and included in the survey to encompass these risk 
dimensions described. Independently, the five questions are not sufficient to accurately assess a 
producer’s risk tolerance, but Grable and Lytton’s (1999) study concluded that when these risk 
dimensions are combined together, they could supply a useful and accurate measure of a 
person’s risk tolerance.  
Other questions in the survey, encompassing a producer’s production decisions, 
marketing methods, and financial management, were included to compare to the risk preference 
questions. Some questions were similarly modeled from previous surveys by Hall et al., (2003); 
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Murphy, (1991); and Schroeder, et al.,(2003), whereas some questions were created by the 
author, committee members and other professionals. Questions and summaries are described in 
Chapter 3.  
2.4 – Summary 
Previous studies on cattle production surveys show preferences from producers and their 
opinions on the breeding and marketing of their cattle. Research on these past surveys, as well as 
research on dimensions of risk and surveys on risk, allow for a good basis to survey cattle 
producers in Kansas and have the ability utilize the data gathered to present adequate results. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Data and Survey Summaries  
3.1 – Introduction 
This chapter describes the data used for this research and presents summary statistics of 
survey responses. Section 3.2 discusses the sources of the data and how they were collected.  
Section 3.3 reports survey results on cow-calf reproduction, calving, weaning and culling 
practices. Section 3.4 reports survey results on marketing and pricing methods.  Section 3.5 
reports survey results on input costs, volatility and comparative advantages.  Section 3.6 reports 
perceptions of sources of risk from questions specifically asked about risk factors and risk 
preferences in the producer’s operation. Finally, Section 3.7 reports survey results that ask three 
simple questions to find out the computer and Internet usage of survey respondents.  
3.2 – Data Sources 
The data used for this research was gathered from Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA) members. The KFMA is one of the largest farm management programs across the 
country. The association is comprised of 20 association economists who work with farm families 
and provide information to members on production and financial management. This membership 
was selected for the survey population because the information from the KFMA data bank can be 
accessed and merged with survey responses.  This provides detailed farm financial information 
together with producer’s preferences from the survey.  This combination of detailed farm 
financial data together with survey responses provides for a rich data set for analysis (see Table 
3.1 for a list of variables).  A survey was mailed on Wednesday, May 20, 2009 to all KFMA 
members who reported owning cows in 2008 which comprised 775 producers (see Appendix A 
for a copy of the survey instrument).  Producers identified their management practices associated 
with risk in the areas of cow-calf reproduction, calving, weaning, culling, marketing and selling, 
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and items concerning general risk factor choices that affect farm income. Additionally, producers 
were presented with five questions soliciting information specifically about dimensions of their 
risk preferences.   
Respondents were given the option of completing the survey by hand and returning, or 
completing via an online version from a web link provided.  A reminder postcard was sent on 
June 4, 2009, and 181 surveys were returned before June 8, a 23.4% initial mailing response rate.  
Another 140 surveys were received after June 8 (date by which respondents would have received 
the reminder and sent the survey).  This gave a total of 321 surveys received with a response rate 
of 41.4%.  Nine participants returned blank surveys indicating they no longer own cattle. 
Therefore, the total useable responses was 312 making the effective response rate of those 
surveyed that own cows 40.7% (assuming all non-respondents still own cows). Eleven 
participants completed the survey online.  Each survey was given a serial code that matched their 
farm number in order for records from the data bank to be matched to each farm. No personal or 
farm names were accessed. Respondent associations and counties were determined by the farm 
number (percentage of response rates from each region reported in Figure 3.1) – the first number 
represents the association and the second and third numbers represent the counties (see Appendix 
B for total responses per county and association). 
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Figure 3.1 Regional Distribution of Survey Respondents 
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The following five tables descriptively explain the survey question variables, their 
definitions and summary statistics. Table 3.1 gives the variables involved with cow-calf 
reproduction, calving and culling of cows.  
3.2.1 – Whole Farm Data Source 
KFMA economists gather data on individual farms such as net farm income, acreage, age 
of operator, capital managed, business entities, farm type, value of farm production, balance 
sheet information and more. Survey responses were matched to these detailed 2008 farm 
management records from the KFMA data bank. Variables used from the data bank are listed in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Whole Farm Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev 
WHOLE 1 if farm has whole farm data; 0 otherwise 312 0.92 0.27 
TACRES Total acres 288 2196.05 1603.74 
CACRES Crop acres 288 1195.26 989.90 
HACRES Harvested acres 288 1178.26 910.42 
WACRES Wheat acres 288 417.25 473.99 
FGACRES Feed grain acres (corn and grain sorghum) 288 292.68 331.34 
OACRES Oilseed acres (soybeans and sunflowers) 288 273.13 345.89 
HFACRES Hay and forage acres (alfalfa, other hay, and 
silage) 288 187.92 202.39 
PASTURE Total pasture acres 288 976.03 1108.77 
OPASTURE Owned pasture acres 288 323.84 584.53 
RPASTURE Rented pasture acres 288 652.19 869.97 
NCOWS Beef cows (number of head) 288 110.09 89.58 
NFEED Beef feeders (number of head – includes 
raised and purchased feeders) 288 117.20 201.71 
PLC Labor devoted to crops (%) 288 0.67 0.21 
NRAISE Raised feeders (number of head) 288 69.47 75.49 
FBINV Beef feeders, beginning inventory (number 
of head) 288 116.68 184.84 
FEINV Beef feeders, ending inventory (number of 
head) 288 121.07 194.67 
BBINV Beef breeding stock, beginning inventory 
(number of head) 288 118.83 96.04 
BEINV Beef breeding stock, ending inventory 
(number of head) 288 117.68 94.63 
GROSSR Gross revenue ($) 288 508497.24 506207.28 
VFP Value of farm production (gross revenue-
purchased feed- purchased livestock) ($) 288 411619.69 371434.89 
GLIVEI Gross livestock income ($) 288 89677.72 131122.30 
BEEFI Accrual beef income ($) 288 73769.73 95088.22 
CUSTOMB Custom beef income ($) 288 3755.18 44133.18 
CUSTOMG Custom grazing income ($) 288 88.29 1010.03 
PBEEF Percentage of gross farm income derived 
from beef 288 0.24 0.24 
DAIRYI Accrual dairy income ($) 288 7327.81 65221.54 
SWINEI Accrual swine income ($) 288 572.34 5213.34 
WHEATI Accrual wheat income ($) 288 89246.09 107297.86 
CORNI Accrual corn income ($) 288 77545.27 148803.35 
SORGI Accrual grain sorghum income ($) 288 30935.17 65522.02 
SOYI Accrual soybean income ($) 288 81974.16 128091.68 
HFI Accrual hay and forage income (alfalfa, other 
hay, and silage) ($) 288 16018.74 48284.39 
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NFI Net farm income ($) 288 112194.90 166051.38 
TEXP Total expenses (cash expenses and 
depreciation) 288 299424.79 240716.89 
TLABOR Total labor expense (paid and unpaid) 288 62149.67 33469.58 
NOPER Number of operators 288 1.02 0.43 
NWORK Number of workers 288 1.37 0.80 
AGE Operator age (primary operator) 288 55.64 11.38 
WAGES Off-farm wages/income (excludes rent, 
royalties, stock returns, etc.) (Thousands $) 288 14.79 23.19 
INT Interest expense (does not include 
opportunity charges) 288 16931.77 20148.66 
UNPAID Unpaid labor ($) 288 51540.79 21693.12 
ASSETC Opportunity charge on net worth ($) 288 69793.86 63062.94 
ETERC Economic total expense ratio below one 288 0.35 0.48 
DEBT Total liabilities ($) 288 275599.22 311783.06 
ASSETS Total assets (Thousands $) 288 1147.69 884.77 
 
3.3 – Cow-Calf Production Practices 
Several survey questions were designed to collect information related to cow-calf 
production practices. Detailed survey questions, variable definitions and summary statistics are 
reported for each section. Table 3.2 shows the cow-calf production practices questions. 
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Table 3.2 Cow-Calf Production Practices Survey Questions - Variable Definitions and 
Summary Statistics  
Survey 
Question Variable N 
Most 
Common 
Response1 Mean Std Dev 
Q13 % of herd A.I.'d (1=0%; 2=10-40%; 3=40-70%; 
4=70-100%) 302 1 1.27 0.62 
Q14 Of cows A.I.'d, % bred (1=0%; 2=10-40%; 
3=40-70%; 4=70-100%) 60 3 3.12 0.58 
Q1A Spring Calve (% of respondents) 312  75.85 29.65 
Q1B Fall Calve (% of respondents) 312  23.18 28.79 
Q11 Expected net return percent increase needed to 
convince change of calving season (1=5%; 
2=10%; 3=18%; 4=22%; 5=Would not consider 
carryover) 276 2 3.05 1.11 
Q3A Typical management of steers after weaning – 
Sell at weaning (5=Always to 1=Never) 287 1 2.82 1.67 
Q3B Typical management of steers after weaning –
Background, then sell (5=Always to 1=Never) 301 1 3.1 1.61 
Q3C Typical management of steers after weaning – 
Retain through finishing (5=Always to 1=Never) 274 1 1.77 1.32 
Q3D Typical management of heifers after weaning  – 
Retain as replacements (5=Always to 1=Never) 299 5 3.39 1.44 
Q3E Typical management of heifers after weaning  – 
Sell at weaning (5=Always to 1=Never) 261 1 2.62 1.54 
Q3F Typical management of heifers after weaning  – 
Background, then sell (5=Always to 1=Never) 274 1 3.12 1.52 
Q3G Typical management of heifers after weaning  – 
Retain through finishing (5=Always to 1=Never)  238 1 1.71 1.25 
Q8 Typical decision when cow comes open (1=Cull 
and sell; 2=Feed out and send to feedlot; 3=Give 
one more chance to get bred next year; 4=Defer to 
alternative calving season herd) 307 1 1.75 1.15 
Q9A Reason to keep an open cow – First time open 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.24 0.43 
Q9B Reason to keep an open cow – Quality of cow 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.3 0.46 
Q9C Reason to keep an open cow – Value of cow 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.09 0.29 
Q9D Reason to keep an open cow – Good reproductive 
record (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.27 0.44 
Q9E Reason to keep an open cow – Cull every open 
cow; no second chances (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.34 0.48 
  1Most Common Response is not displayed for continuous variables. 
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The majority of respondents, 79.8%, do not artificially inseminate (A.I.) their herd, 
therefore 20.2% do A.I., in which they answered if they A.I. 10-40% of their herd, 40-70% of 
their herd or 70-100% of their herd. Percentages are reported in Table 3.3. Of the 20.2% that do 
A.I., the mainstream of respondents, 65.0%, reported typically having a 40-70% success rate of 
bred cows through A.I. Respondents who reported typically achieving a success rate of 70-100% 
were smaller at 23.3% and the smallest amount, 11.7%, reported a typical success rate in the 
range of 10-40%.  
Table 3.3 Artificial Insemination 
 0% 
Rate 
10-40% 
Rate 
40-70% 
Rate 
70-100% 
Rate 
% of herd A.I.’d 79.8% 14.9% 3.3% 2.0% 
Of cows A.I.’d, % typically bred -- 11.7% 65.0% 23.3% 
 
Respondents generally calve in the spring with 75.8% indicating a January through June 
calving period and 23.2% calving in the fall (July through December). When producers were 
asked how much more their expected return would need to be to convince them to retain and 
feed calves over to sell in March if they typically market their spring-born calves at weaning in 
November, the most common response, 35.1%, was that they would consider retaining calves to 
sell in March if their expected net return would be 10% higher. Only 14.86% of respondents 
reported they would not consider carrying them over. 
Producers were asked what they did with their calves each year after weaning. Questions 
were broken into two groupings: steers and heifers. Possible responses were “Always”, “Often”, 
“Sometimes”, “Seldom” or “Never” in which the respondent could circle the response that best 
fit their production decisions. Each of the seven production systems encounters a unique set of 
production costs and produces calves for market at different periods of the year.  For steer calves, 
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27.5% of respondents reported always selling steers after weaning, 28.2% always backgrounded 
steers then sold them, and only 9.5% always retained steers through finishing. For heifers, 29.1% 
reported always retaining heifers as replacements, 19.2% always sell heifers after weaning, 
24.8% always background heifers then sell them, and only 8.0% always retain heifers through 
finishing. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the percentages of answers by producers. The majority of 
steer producers background at least some of their steers then sell them. The majority of heifer 
producers retain at least some heifers as replacements.  
 
Figure 3.2 Producer Preferences of Feeding Steer Calves After Weaning 
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Figure 3.3 Producer Preferences of Feeding Heifer Calves After Weaning 
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Producers were asked when they had a cow that does not settle/comes up open, what 
decision they typically make.  Figure 3.4 shows percentages of these decisions. The majority of 
producers, 66.8%, would cull immediately and sell the cow. Almost 15% of respondents would 
defer to an alternative calving season, and 12.1% would give the cow one more chance to get 
bred the following year. Only 6.5% of respondents would feed out the open cow and send to get 
processed.  
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Figure 3.4 Producer Preferences on Open Cows 
 
 
Producers have different reasons for keeping an open cow. Survey respondents were 
given options such as first time open, the quality of the cow (i.e. registered, good genetics), the 
value of the cow, or a good reproductive record, as well as given the chance to choose more than 
one answer.  The most widely reported response, 34.3% of respondents, give no second chances 
to an open cow to impregnate no matter the circumstance and cull every open cow. Almost 30% 
of respondents noted that they would keep an open cow because of her quality, while 27% said 
they would keep an open cow because of her good reproductive record.  When a cow is open for 
the first time, 23.7% of producers will keep her for another breeding season, and 9.3% of 
producers will keep a cow depending on her value (i.e. how much money has been put into her: 
quality, vaccinations or otherwise). Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of percentages.  
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Figure 3.5 Reasons to Keep an Open Cow 
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3.4 – Marketing and Pricing Methods 
Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for the marketing and pricing methods questions 
in the survey.  
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Table 3.4 Marketing and Pricing Methods Survey Questions - Variable Definitions and 
Summary Statistics  
Survey 
Question Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Q2A Participation in production management program – Retain 
Ownership of Calves (1=Yes;0=No) 312 0.37 0.48 
Q2B Participation in production management program –  Certified 
Feeder Cattle (1=Yes;0=No) 312 0.03 0.18 
Q2C Participation in production management program –  Product 
Specified Feeder Cattle (1=Yes;0=No) 312 0.11 0.31 
Q2D Participation in production management program –  Pasture to 
Plate Alliances (1=Yes;0=No) 312 0.01 0.11 
Q2E Participation in production management program –  Other 
(1=Yes;0=No) 312 0.14 0.35 
Q6A Reason to Retain Ownership – Risk worthwhile (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.36 0.48 
Q6B Reason to Retain Ownership – Performance data (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312 0.13 0.34 
Q6C Reason to Retain Ownership – Carcass data (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.13 0.33 
Q6D Reason to Retain Ownership – Genetic/value-added 
improvement (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.16 0.37 
Q6E Reason to Retain Ownership – Other (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.03 0.18 
Q7A Reason to Not Retain Ownership – No add'l profit (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312 0.17 0.38 
Q7B Reason to Not Retain Ownership – No carcass data (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312 0.05 0.22 
Q7C Reason to Not Retain Ownership – Do not want risk while in 
feedlot (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.47 0.5 
Q7D Reason to Not Retain Ownership – Want revenue before calves 
finish (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.35 0.48 
Q7E Reason to Not Retain Ownership – No relationship with feedlot 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.26 0.44 
Q7F Reason to Not Retain Ownership – Other (1=Yes; 0=No) 312 0.09 0.29 
Q4A Direct Marketing (% of marketing method typically used) 311 15.43 32.19 
Q4B Local auction barn normal sale (% of marketing method 
typically used) 311 70.03 40.16 
Q4C Local auction barn special graded sale (% of marketing method 
typically used) 311 8.71 23.87 
Q4D Video auction (% of marketing method typically used) 311 3.37 14.61 
Q4E Other (% of marketing method typically used) 311 2.46 13.73 
Q5A Forward contracting/mktg agreement (% of pricing method 
typically used) 309 4.64 17.77 
Q5B Futures Hedging (% of pricing method typically used) 309 1.47 8.46 
Q5C Futures options (% of pricing method typically used) 309 1.96 9.75 
Q5D Cash only (% of pricing method typically used) 309 90.02 25.08 
Q5E Other (% of pricing method typically used) 309 1.91 12.67 
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Survey questions on production management programs did not garner very high response 
rates. This could be predicted after summaries in Section 3.3 show that 28.2% of producers either 
background steers and then sell them or sell steers after weaning (27.5%). Only 9.5% retain 
steers through finishing. However, those that responded “yes” to this question on participation in 
production management programs, retained ownership was the most popular program with 
37.2% of respondents (116 producers). A small 10.9% of respondents participate in a product 
specified feeder cattle programs, 3.21% in certified feeder cattle programs, 1.28% in pasture to 
plate alliance programs, and 13.8% specified “other”. Common other programs listed were: 
owning registered stock for breeding and selling; backgrounding until around 800 pounds; 
natural, organic or grass-fed programs; and age and source verified programs. Figure 3.6 shows 
the allocation of percentages.  
Figure 3.6 Production Management Programs  
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In order to view respondents preferences for either retaining ownership of their calves or 
not, they were asked two questions that allowed them to indicate reasons for retaining ownership 
or reasons for not retaining ownership. Reasons to retain ownership are listed in Figure 3.7. The 
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reason with the most responses, 35.6%, was that producers see the risk worthwhile to earn the 
potential of more dollars per head by retaining ownership of their feeders. Producers who earn a 
return for genetic improvements or value-added investments (16.4%), was the second highest 
reason to retain. Other common reasons to retain ownership were to use up low quality roughage, 
market their calves as age and source verified, and others noted that they only retain ownership if 
they have the feed to do so.  
Figure 3.7 Reasons to Retain Ownership 
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A large proportion of respondents (46.8%) reported they do not retain ownership because 
they do not want to take the risk involved with ownership feeders in the feedlot (Figure 3.8). 
Others want to receive revenue earlier than waiting until calves are finished (34.6%).  There 
were several other reasons for not retaining ownership. Generally, some producers note that they 
would like carcass data, but it is not possible to obtain them through their sale barn, or they want 
to maximize capital by only owning cattle under their direct management. Others want to spread 
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out risk rather than retaining 100%, do not have enough calves to fill a pen or the adequate 
pasture or facilities, and others just do not want the added work.  
Figure 3.8  Reasons for NOT Retaining Ownership  
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In terms of marketing methods of calves sold annually, selling at a local auction barn 
normal sale was most common (70%), whereas 15.4% used direct marketing, 8.1% use a local 
auction barn special graded sale, 3.4% use a video auction sale, and 2.5% indicated using other 
marketing methods. Common other forms of marketing methods were private treaty sales of 
registered stock, or selling to feedlot or packer directly.  
In terms of typical pricing methods of calves sold annually, cash only pricing methods 
was the most popular (90%), whereas 4.6% used forward contracting or marketing agreements, 
2.0% used futures options, 1.9% indicated other pricing methods, and 1.5% used futures 
hedging.   
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3.5 – Inputs Costs, Volatility, and Comparative Advantages 
Table 3.5 presents the responses to questions pertaining to input costs, volatility, and 
comparative advantage.  
Table 3.5 Input Costs, Volatility and Comparative Advantages Survey Questions - Variable 
Definitions and Summary Statistics  
Survey 
Question Variable N 
Most 
Common 
Response1 Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Q10A Producer’s ranking of input costs – Animal health 
costs (1 being largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  4.81 1.73 
Q10B Producer’s ranking of input costs – Cost of 
breeding stock (1 being largest cost to 8 being 
lowest cost) 306  3.97 1.9 
Q10C Producer’s ranking of input costs – Feed costs (1 
being largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  1.91 1.38 
Q10D Producer’s ranking of input costs – Fuel (1 being 
largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  5.68 1.77 
Q10E Producer’s ranking of input costs – Interest (1 
being largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  5.99 1.94 
Q10F Producer’s ranking of input costs – Labor (1 being 
largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  5.58 1.84 
Q10G Producer’s ranking of input costs – Maintenance 
costs (1 being largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 306  5.39 1.74 
Q10H Producer’s ranking of input costs – Pasture 
rent/ownership costs (1 being largest cost to 8 
being lowest cost) 306  2.67 1.81 
Q23A Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Purchase 
insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.36 0.48 
Q23B Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Off-farm 
income(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.38 0.48 
Q23C Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Saving 
funds in good years (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.53 0.5 
Q23D Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Selling 
more cull cows in hard times; retaining more other 
times (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.29 0.46 
Q23E Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Utilizing 
marketing methods to sell calves (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.34 0.47 
Q25A Alternative pasture use – Agritourism (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312  0.01 0.08 
Q25B Alternative pasture use – Energy development 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.09 0.28 
Q25C Alternative pasture use – Hunting (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.36 0.48 
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Q25D Alternative pasture use – Leased out to another 
herd (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.03 0.16 
Q25E Alternative pasture use – Recreation (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312  0.09 0.29 
Q25F Alternative pasture use – Other (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.54 0.5 
Q25G No Alternative pasture use  (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.04 0.18 
Q20A Comparative Advantages – Analysis and use of 
new technology (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.26 0.44 
Q20B Comparative Advantages – Business planning 
skills (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.21 0.41 
Q20C Comparative Advantages – Cattle genetics 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.59 0.49 
Q20D Comparative Advantages – High quality 
land/pasture (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.47 0.5 
Q20E Comparative Advantages – Loan and interest rate 
management (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.35 0.48 
Q20F Comparative Advantages – Low cost (1=Yes; 
0=No) 312  0.53 0.5 
Q20G Comparative Advantages – Machinery 
management (1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.36 0.48 
Q20H Comparative Advantages – Marketing skills 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.2 0.4 
Q20I Comparative Advantages – Personnel management 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.33 0.47 
Q20J Comparative Advantages – Production skills 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 312  0.7 0.46 
Q12A Cattle herd size change over next two years 
(1=expanding; 2=reducing; 3=remaining same) 301 3 2.07 0.93 
Q12B Crop acreage change over next two years 
(1=expanding; 2=reducing; 3=remaining same) 293 3 2.23 0.9 
1Most Common Response is not displayed for continuous variables. 
 
In today’s volatile economy, inputs costs can play a large role in terms of overall risk in a 
cow-calf producer’s operation. Producers were asked to rank input costs from one to eight – one 
being the largest cost –  with the following options: animal health costs, cost of breeding stock, 
feed costs (corn, hay, mineral, etc.), fuel, interest, labor, maintenance costs, and pasture rent or 
ownership costs.  Table 3.6 below shows the overall rankings. Producers believed that feed costs 
were the largest cost to them, followed by pasture rent/ownership costs.  Interest cost was the 
least costly to them.  
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Table 3.6 Input Costs, Rankings and Means 
Rank             
(1 being 
largest cost) 
Input Costs Mean 
1 Feed Costs 1.9 
2 Pasture rent/ownership costs 2.7 
3 Cost of breeding stock 4.0 
4 Animal health costs 4.8 
5 Maintenance Costs 5.4 
6 Labor 5.6 
7 Fuel 5.7 
8 Interest 6.0 
 
Producers were also asked how they manage farm/ranch income volatility. Table 3.7 
shows the order of how producers chose the best practices to manage their income volatility. 
Most prevalent was saving funds in good years (52.9%), followed by receiving off-farm income 
(37.5%) and purchasing insurance (36.2%). 
Table 3.7 Rankings of Farm/Ranch Income Volatility Among Respondents 
Rank Practices to manage farm/ranch income volatility % 
1 Saving funds in good years 52.9% 
2 Off-farm income 37.5% 
3 Purchase insurance 36.2% 
4 Utilizing marketing methods  33.7% 
5 Selling more cull cows during hard times and retaining more at other times 29.5% 
 
Related to farm/ranch income is how producers make use of pasture ground for 
alternative uses other than grazing their personal herd.  Choices for them were agritourism, 
energy development (oil, gas or wind), hunting, leasing out to another herd, recreation, other, or 
none.  Table 3.8 gives the breakdown of percentages per pasture ground for reasons other than 
grazing. Other alternative uses, which was the majority with 54.5%, included: fishing ponds, 
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haying, cell phone tower, fescue production of seed, and pecans. The next largest alternative use 
was hunting (36.2%). The remaining alternatives were much smaller percentages: recreation 
(9.0%), energy development (8.7%), leasing out to another herd (2.6%), and agritourism (0.6%). 
Three and a half percent reported using no alternative uses for their pasture ground.   
Table 3.8 Alternative Uses for Pasture Ground Other Than Grazing 
Alternative pasture use % 
Other 54.5% 
Hunting 36.2% 
Recreation 9.0% 
Energy development (oil, gas, or wind) 8.7% 
None 3.5% 
Leased out to another herd 2.6% 
Agritourism 0.6% 
  
A producer’s comparative advantage refers to their ability to produce (cattle or crops) at a 
lower marginal cost and opportunity cost than other producers of the same ability and 
competence (Sheffrin, 2003) or the ability to differentiate their product. The ability for a 
producer to have comparative advantages in the cow-calf industry is important, especially in a 
volatile economy, to allow for differentiated products and markets, which in-turn allows for the 
opportunity of a higher profit margin for that producer.  A survey question asked what factors 
were considered to be the producer’s top five comparative advantages in their operations.   
Production skills took the majority vote of producer’s rankings with 70.2%.  Production 
skills can include forage and crop yields, calving rates, weaning weights, etc.  A producer with 
high calving rates, for example, can utilize their comparative advantage in production skills as a 
good producer to calve out and keep calves healthy to maximize revenue when selling at 
weaning. Cattle genetics was the second highest ranking (59.3% of respondents consider this as 
their comparative advantage). This shows that producers are interested in improving their herd 
and allowing themselves to have a comparative advantage with their ability to bring good 
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genetics into their herd, either to improve carcass traits or for selling cattle for breeding. 
Comparative advantage rankings were followed by low costs (52.9%), high quality land/pasture 
(47.4%), and machinery management (36.2%).  Some results were surprising, such as cattle 
genetics being the second highest comparative advantage (59.3% of respondents) when only 
20% of respondents reported using artificial insemination to improve genetics in their herd.  It is 
also interesting that marking skills was the lowest comparative advantage (19.6% of 
respondents). However, this is not surprising as nearly 86% of respondents are categorized as 
risk averse and 70% use a local auction barn to market their calves, thus not utilizing marketing 
techniques. Further investigation would be interesting to know the survey taker’s motives behind 
why they consider themselves to have any specific comparative advantage. All percentages are 
reported in Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9 Producer Perceptions of Comparative Advantages 
Comparative Advantage % 
Production skills (forage yields, calving rates, weaning weights, etc.) 70.2% 
Cattle genetics 59.3% 
Low cost 52.9% 
High quality land/pasture 47.4% 
Machinery management 36.2% 
Loan and interest rate management 34.6% 
Personnel management 33.0% 
Analysis and use of new technology 26.0% 
Business planning skills (transition planning, business structure, 
alliances, etc.) 20.8% 
Marketing skills 19.6% 
 
Looking forward into the next two years, producers were asked how they envisioned their 
cattle herd and crop acreage changing; they were given the choices of expanding in size, 
reducing in size, or remaining the same size for each option (Table 3.10). The majority for both 
cattle herd and crop acreage is to remain the same size. Interestingly, about the same percentage 
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for each cattle and crops responded to expanding in size (31.7-39.5%), as well as reducing in size 
(13.95-14.0%).  Since a majority of producers in this population (98.9%) have crops and cattle 
both reported in their operation, it is possible that if a producer is expanding their cattle herd size 
in the next two years, they are also looking to expand crop acreage. This comparison may also be 
the same for a reduction in size. Correlations will be analyzed in Chapter 5.  
Table 3.10 Cattle Herd and Crop Acreage Changes in Next Two Years 
 Cattle Herd Crop Acreage 
Expanding in size 39.5% 31.7% 
Reducing in size 14.0% 13.7% 
Remaining the same size 46.5% 54.6% 
 
3.6 – Perceptions of Sources of Risk 
Perceptions of risk are a key part to this study. Table 3.11 gives the survey questions 
asked on risk factors and tolerances, as well as the summary statistics.  
Table 3.11 Perceptions of Sources of Risk Survey Questions - Variable Definitions and 
Summary Statistics  
Survey 
Question Variable N 
Most 
Common 
Response1 Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Q21A General risk factors to cow operations – Drought 
(5=Very Concerned to 1=Not Concerned) 306 4 3.84 0.94 
Q21B General risk factors to cow operations – 
Unexpectedly low cattle prices (5=Very 
Concerned to 1=Not Concerned) 305 4 3.98 0.91 
Q21C General risk factors to cow operations – High 
replacement heifer prices (5=Very Concerned to 
1=Not Concerned) 305 3 2.81 1.04 
Q21D General risk factors to cow operations – Variation 
in non-feed input prices (5=Very Concerned to 
1=Not Concerned) 306 3 3.25 0.9 
Q21E General risk factors to cow operations – Changes 
in gov't environmental programs (5=Very 
Concerned to 1=Not Concerned) 304 4 3.61 1.15 
Q21F General risk factors to cow operations – Storms 
(5=Very Concerned to 1=Not Concerned) 306 4 3.38 1.04 
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Q21G General risk factors to cow operations – Changes 
in gov't farm programs (5=Very Concerned to 
1=Not Concerned) 304 4 3.34 1.03 
Q21H General risk factors to cow operations – High 
hay/forage prices (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 303 3 3.34 0.9 
Q21I General risk factors to cow operations – Animal 
Disease (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not Concerned) 304 4 3.55 0.96 
Q21J General risk factors to cow operations – High 
land prices (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 306 4 3.66 1.06 
Q21K General risk factors to cow operations – Rented 
pasture availability (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 305 4 3.63 1.13 
Q21L General risk factors to cow operations – Labor 
availability (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 307 3 2.86 0.99 
Q21M General risk factors to cow operations – High 
price of labor (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 307 3 2.84 0.95 
Q21N General risk factors to cow operations – Credit 
availability (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 307 3 2.88 1.07 
Q21O General risk factors to cow operations – High 
interest rates (5=Very Concerned to 1=Not 
Concerned) 307 4 3.49 1.21 
Q22A Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income –
Maintaining animal health (5=Very Important to 
1=Not Important) 307 5 4.4 0.84 
Q22B Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Being a low-cost producer (5=Very Important to 
1=Not Important) 305 4 4.2 0.77 
Q22C Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Receiving premiums for calves sold (5=Very 
Important to 1=Not Important) 305 4 3.99 0.75 
Q22D Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Maintaining financial/credit reserves (5=Very 
Important to 1=Not Important) 302 4 3.85 0.84 
Q22E Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Retaining calves for market timing (5=Very 
Important to 1=Not Important) 300 4 3.44 0.91 
Q22F Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Specializing in one phase of cattle production 
(5=Very Important to 1=Not Important) 304 3 3.16 0.86 
Q22G Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Diversifying in numerous ranch/farm enterprises 304 4 3.53 1.02 
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(5=Very Important to 1=Not Important) 
Q22H Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – 
Forward contracting futures & options (5=Very 
Important to 1=Not Important) 304 3 2.68 1.02 
Q24A Cow-calf herd most important part of income 
(5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 307 3 3.31 1.15 
Q24B Economy has focused attention on financial 
mgmt (5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 306 4 3.8 0.74 
Q24C Economy has focused attention on marketing 
(5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 305 4 3.51 0.72 
Q24D Economy has focused attention on intensive herd 
mgmt (5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 304 4 3.53 0.77 
Q24E Individually ID is critical to operation 
(5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 302 4 3.65 0.97 
Q24F Would participate in value-added programs to 
increase returns (5=Strongly Agree to 1=Strongly 
Disagree) 306 4 3.77 0.82 
Q24G Disease prevention is important (5=Strongly 
Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 305 4 4.33 0.76 
Q24H Consult with vet for health program (5=Strongly 
Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 305 4 3.92 0.92 
Q24I Inspect herd at least twice weekly (5=Strongly 
Agree to 1=Strongly Disagree) 306 4 3.79 0.97 
Q24J BCS of cows is important (5=Strongly Agree to 
1=Strongly Disagree) 304 4 3.78 0.76 
Q15 Neighbor’s observation of own risk taking 
behavior (1=risk avoider; 2=cautious; 3=risk 
taker after adequate research; 4=real gambler) 296 2 2.86 1.28 
Q16 Choice of selling calves at different production 
stages (1=sell at weaning; 2=retain for two 
months post weaning; 3=retain through finishing) 295 1 2.04 1.13 
Q17 Marketing options most preferred from scenario 
(1=most risk averse to 4=most risk preferring)  281 3 3.28 2.05 
Q18 Investment scenario at 20% success rate 
(1=nothing; 2=$1,000; 3=$10,000; 4=$50,000; 
5=$100,000; 6=more than $100,000) 300 1 1.71 2 
Q19 Investment at 60% success rate (1=nothing; 
2=$1,000; 3=$10,000; 4=$50,000; 5=$100,000; 
6=more than $100,000) 297 3 3.19 2.9 
1Most Common Response is not displayed for continuous variables. 
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Respondents were asked to rate sources of general risk factors on a concerned level from 
5 (Very Concerned) to 1 (Not Concerned). This survey question was fashioned from a survey by 
Hall (2003), where drought and cattle price variability were the two greatest concerns. For this 
survey, responses of unexpectedly low cattle prices and drought were the greatest two concerns, 
with average responses of 4.0 and 3.8 respectively (Figure 3.9). High land prices, rented pasture 
availability, changes in government environmental programs and animal disease were the next 
cluster with an average response ranging from 3.5 to 3.6. Availability of credit and labor, high 
price of labor and high price of replacement heifers were of least concern to producers. 
Figure 3.9 Producers’ Perception of General Risk Factors by Level of Importance to Cow 
Operation 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5
High replacement heifer prices
High price of labor
Labor availability
Credit availability
Variation in non-feed input prices
Changes in government farm programs
High hay/forage prices
Storms (snow, ice, lightening, etc.)
High interest rates
Animal Disease
Changes in gov’t environmental programs
Rented pasture availability
High land prices
Drought
Unexpectedly low cattle prices
Mean scale
1-Not Concerned to 5-Very Concerned 
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Next, producers were asked to rank risk factors in terms of importance that could 
potentially affect ranch/farm income. This had a similar scale system of 5 (Very Important) to 1 
(Not Important), which was also shaped from Hall’s (2003) study where maintaining animal 
health was clearly viewed by respondents as the most important.  In this study, maintaining 
animal health was also the top factor of importance, followed by being a low-cost producer with 
average responses of 4.4 and 4.2, respectively (Figure 3.10). Receiving premiums for calves 
sold, maintaining financial/credit reserves and diversifying in numerous ranch/farm enterprises 
were the second highest grouping with average responses ranging from 3.5 to 3.9. Specializing in 
one phase of cattle production and forward contracting futures and options were of least 
importance with average responses of 3.2 and 2.7 respectively. It is not surprising that forward 
contracting, futures and options was the factor that producer’s determined as least important in 
terms of affecting their farm/ranch income.  In a previous question, only 4.6% of respondents 
reported to use forward contracting or marketing agreements, 2.0% use futures options, 1.9% 
indicate other pricing methods, and 1.5% use futures hedging; therefore, this factor doesn’t affect 
the sample population’s potential risk factors affecting their farm/ranch income as much as 
maintaining animal health and being a low cost producer. 
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Figure 3.10 Producers’ Perceptions of Potential Risk Factors to Affect Farm/Ranch Income 
 
 
Next, producers were asked a series of 10 questions in which they could respond with a 
range of 5 (Strongly Agree) to 1 (Strongly Disagree). The questions were not mutually exclusive, 
but merely asked about the producer’s management preferences. The first question asked if the 
producer viewed their cow-calf herd as the most important part of their overall farm income in 
economic terms.  The most common response and average response (3 and 3.31 respectively) 
both coincided that producers were neutral on the statement (30.3%).  However, 19.2% of 
respondents indicated they strongly agree that their cow-calf herd is the most important part of 
their overall farm income and 23.8% agree.  
Producers were asked if recent economic instability has focused their attention to spend 
more time on three categories: careful financial management, marketing, and intensive herd 
management in their operations. Nearly half, and even over half of respondents in one case, for 
each of the three categories agree that their attention has been focused with 59.5% of respondents 
on more careful financial management, 49.8% on marketing, and 47.4% on more intensive herd 
1 2 3 4 5
Forward contracting futures & options
Specializing in one phase of cattle production
Retaining calves for market timing
Diversifying in numerous ranch/farm enterprises
Maintaining financial/credit reserves
Receiving premiums for calves sold
Being a low-cost producer
Maintaining animal health
Mean scale
1-Not Important to 5-Very Important 
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management. These results definitely show a strain that has been placed on producers because of 
the volatile economy and special focus on aspects of their operation is important for continuance 
of the operation.  
Individually identifying cattle is a part of some cow-calf producer’s operations, so we 
asked them if individually identifying cattle is crucial to the operation and marketing of their 
cattle. Around 32% of respondents were neutral as to the importance of identifying cattle in their 
operations, while 38.4% agreed that individually identifying their cattle was important.  
 Following that, producers were asked if they would participate in a value-added program 
to increase returns to their operation. The most common response was 46.7% of respondents who 
agreed that they would participate in a program to increase returns and 30.1% of respondents 
were neutral to the subject.  
Disease prevention should be an important factor to any cow-calf producer, and this is 
reflected by responses of cow-calf producers. Producers agreed (48.2%) that disease prevention 
was important in their cow-calf herd, and a close second (44.6%) strongly agreed to this topic. A 
small response from producers of 7.2% responded to neutral, disagree or strongly disagree 
combined. 
Many producers (41.6%) agreed they consult with a veterinarian regularly to develop and 
implement a whole-herd health program. Some even strongly agree (25.8%) that they consult 
with a veterinarian and 22.2% are neutral to consulting with a veterinarian about the health of 
their herd. Some may be neutral or disagree to this as 98.9% of respondents are crop and cattle 
producers and they choose not to consult with a veterinarian about their cow herd as they only 
doctor if the need arises.  
 38 
Along with consulting with a veterinarian, producers who check their herd more often 
know the health of their herd better and can doctor sooner, as well as finding fencing problems or 
cattle that may have gotten out. When asked if producers inspect their herd at least twice weekly, 
40.2% agree, 25.8% strongly agree, and 22.2% are neutral.  A small response of 12% disagreed 
to checking their herd at least twice weekly.  
Lastly in this compilation of producer preference questions, they were asked if body 
condition scoring of cows is important. Over half of respondents (57.9%) agreed that this is 
important to their operation. A smaller percentage (13.2%) strongly agreed to this and 23.0% 
were neutral on the matter. All ten of these questions will be used in later chapters to analyze and 
relate to risk preferences of producers. 
 The most important questions in the survey used to access the producer’s risk preferences 
were created from research by Grable and Lytton (1999) and further tested in a follow-up study 
by the same authors in 2003. These questions were created with causal risk dimensions described 
in Chapter 2.  These five questions were weighted and combined to create the new variable, Risk 
Preference Score (RPS), which will be described in Chapter 4 on model development.  
The first question used the risk dimensions of: 1) risk as a level of experience and 
knowledge and 2) speculative risk. It asked respondents how their neighbor would describe their 
own risk taking behavior in terms of their farm/ranch management, given the answers of “a risk 
avoider”, “cautious”, “willing to take risks after adequate research” and “a real gambler”.  The 
most widely held response was respondents described as cautious at 52.4%. “Willing to take 
risks after adequate research” described 39.9% of the respondents, “a risk avoider” described 
5.7% of respondents, and “a real gambler” described 2% of respondents.  
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The next risk question contained two dimensions of risk: 1) guaranteed vs. probable 
gambles and 2) speculative risk.  This question set up a scenario revealing to producers that if 
they could sell their calves at different production stages, what stage would they choose, given 
the options: a) selling at weaning, b) retaining for two months post weaning with a 30% chance 
of netting an additional $5/head, 10% chance of losing $10/head, or 60% chance of netting no 
additional dollars per head; and c) retaining through finishing with a 30% chance of netting an 
additional $40/head, 15% chance of losing $50/head, or 55% chance of netting no additional 
dollars per head. Most commonly, respondents selected the most risk averse answer of selling at 
weaning (40%), followed by retaining for two months post weaning (38%), and retaining 
through finishing (22%). 
The third risk question was developed with three risk dimensions: 1) guaranteed vs. 
probable gambles, 2) choice between sure loss and sure gain and 3) speculative risk. This 
scenario question asked producers if given the best and worst case potential outcomes from 
marketing their weaned calves, which net return/loss prospect would they prefer from four 
possible choices. These four choices ranged from risk averse (small return and no loss potential) 
to risk preferring (large return and large loss potential). The largest response (46.3%) was for the 
second highest risk preferring answer of a $65/calf return best case; $35/calf loss worst case 
reaction. The other three answers had lower response rates; 26.0% for the most risk averse 
answer of $20/calf return best case and $0/calf loss worst case; 17.4% for the second risk averse 
answer of $35/calf return best case; $20/calf loss worst case; 10.3% for the highest risk 
preferring answer of $100/calf return best case; $75/calf loss worst case. 
The last two risk preference questions were similar with different success rates for an 
investment and used the same two risk dimensions: 1) guaranteed vs. probable gambles and 2) 
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speculative risk.  The first question sets up the background to tell the respondent that their trusted 
friend was putting together investors to fund a new innovative business venture that could pay 
back more than 50 times the investment if successful, which is a 20% success rate. However, the 
investment would be worthless if the venture was a bust. Respondents were given the choice of 
six options: nothing; $1,000, $10,000, $50,000, $100,000, or more than $100,000. Over half of 
respondents chose the most risk averse option of investing nothing (59.3%). Nearly a third, 
30.7%, of respondents would invest $1,000, 9.3% would  invest $10,000, 0.3% would invest 
$50,000, no one was willing to invest $100,000, but a small 0.3% would invest more than 
$100,000.   
The second similar question changed the success rate from 20% to 60% and then asked 
how much they were now willing to invest given the same answer choices.  The majority 
increased to be willing to invest $10,000 (39.4%), followed by 32.0% willing to invest $1,000, 
21.9% still willing to invest nothing, 4.7% willing to invest $50,000, 1.7% now willing to invest 
$100,000 and the same 0.3% willing to invest more than $100,000.  
These five risk preference questions will be compared to the producers’ data compiled in 
the KFMA data bank in further chapters.  
3.7 – Computer and Internet Access 
Having access to a computer for a cow-calf producer can help with record keeping, and 
Internet access can allow a producer to access market information and catch up on news to read 
about what is going on in the industry. Three simple questions asked producers if they, 1) own a 
computer, 2) have Internet access, and 3) if they have do Internet access, how often they access it 
(Table 3.12). 
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Table 3.12 Computer and Internet Access Survey Questions - Variable Definitions and 
Summary Statistics  
Survey 
Question Variable N 
Most 
Common 
Response1 Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Q26 Own a computer (1=Yes; 0=No) 309 1 0.87 0.34 
Q27 Have internet access (1=Yes; 0=No) 309 1 0.84 0.36 
Q28 How often access internet (1=Daily; 
2=Weekly; 3=Monthly; 4=Less often) 267 1 1.72 1.02 
1Most Common Response is not displayed for continuous variables. 
 
Those who own a computer was 86.7% of respondents and 13.3% did not report to own a 
computer. Almost the same breakdown of response percentages was for those who have Internet 
access, in which 84.5% have access and 15.5% do not have access to the Internet. Over half of 
respondents (57.7%) access the Internet daily, 24.3% access it weekly, 6.0% access it monthly 
and 12.0% access the Internet less often than monthly. 
3.8 – Summary 
This chapter was used for reporting summary results from the cow-calf risk preference 
survey instrument.  This data gathered will be combined with 2008 KFMA farm data and used to 
create and analyze models and report results on the overall purpose of the study.  
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CHAPTER 4 - Operating Decisions Related to Risk Preferences:  
Model Specifications 
4.1 – Introduction 
This chapter will help determine how producers’ operating decisions related to calf-
timing, health management, feeding and grazing, breeding, culling, and selling are related to risk 
aversion. In Section 4.2, the Risk Preference Score (RPS) variable is developed and defined from 
five specific survey question responses, Section 4.3 defines the model specifications for the basic 
model to support what operating decisions are related to risk preferences, then Section 4.4 
describes the estimated equation. In order to determine other operating decisions that affect the 
RPS, sensitivity analysis was conducted and defined in Section 4.5, with the new estimated 
equations following in Section 4.6. Results are reported in Section 4.7.  
 
4.2 – Risk Preference Score 
In order to assess a cow-calf producer’s risk preference, a variable was created to show 
an individual producer’s evident “score” that could be used and compared to other attitudinal and 
production questions, as well as whole farm data. Five questions in the survey were asked to 
determine the producer’s “Risk Preference Score” (RPS). These five questions were decided on 
from Grable and Lytton’s research on risk preferences in 1999 and follow-up study in 2003, 
which contained the risk dimensions discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.7. The Risk Preference 
Score (RPS) variable was created by summing the weights corresponding to each response for 
questions 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, the five questions created according to previous literature to 
combine certain dimensions of risk.  Each response for these five questions was squared to give 
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more weight to the most risk-preferring answers (Table 4.1). Higher scores represented higher 
levels of risk preference, whereas lower scores represented lower levels of risk preference.  
Table 4.1 Survey Questions and Given Weights for Calculation of Risk Preference Score 
Variable 
Question # Answer Choices and Calculated Weights 
15 a = 12; b = 22; c = 32; d = 42 
16 a = 12; b = 22; c = 32; 
17 a = 12; b = 22; c = 32; d = 42 
18 a = 12; b = 22; c = 32; d = 42; e = 52; f = 62 
19 a = 12; b = 22; c = 32; d = 42; e = 52; f = 62 
 
This method coincided with Grable and Lytton’s (1999) index groupings, as well as 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985). Both of these studies categorized their survey respondents 
using similar indexes customized to their study; thus, this study uses the same method arbitrarily 
reorganized to fit the questions and data asked of the KFMA members. The RPS variable is 
defined by: 
(1)    𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗2, 
where i refers to individual producers, Q is the answer given to each question (j) by each 
producer (i) and j is refers to each question (N=5).  As calculated, the smaller RPS, the more risk 
averse is the respondent. The average RPS was 26.2, with a median of 25, a standard deviation of 
11.8, and a range from 5 to 86. Figure 4.1 shows the percent distribution of scores from the 
respondents, including the median.  
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Figure 4.1 Risk Preference Score Response Percent Distribution of Scores with Median 
 
 
The risk preference scores were categorized to encompass the 20th percentiles, starting 
with the lowest 20% (low risk preference), second lowest 20% (below average risk preference), 
middle 20% (average/moderate risk preference), second highest 20% (above average risk 
preference) and highest 20% (high risk preference). This method also used by Grable and Lytton 
(1999), as well as MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985).  However, for this study, the method was 
arbitrarily categorized in order to compare producers simply relative to other respondents.  Table 
4.2 categorizes the producer’s RPS to what type of risk they prefer.  
Table 4.2 Risk Preference Score Categories 
RPS Category 
5 to 21 Low Risk Preference 
22 to 38 Below Average Risk Preference 
39 to 55 Average/Moderate Risk Preference 
56 to 72 Above Average Risk Preference 
73 to 86 High Risk Preference 
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Figure 4.2  Risk Categories and Reported Percentages 
 
 
 The percentages of responses, as shown in Figure 4.2, reveal that 36% of Kansas 
producers possess a low risk preference (very risk averse), 49.6% possess a below average risk 
preference (somewhat risk averse), 12.1% possess an average/moderate risk preference (neutral 
risk partiality), 2.2% possess an above average risk preference (somewhat risk preferring), and 
0.4% possess a high risk preference (very risk preferring). Thus, nearly 86% of Kansas cow-calf 
producer survey respondents are risk averse using the categorization scheme developed here. As 
mentioned in the literature, price and production risk are ambiguous and even risk choices 
among individuals change over time and in the midst of different situations. These are not the 
only factors affecting a producer’s risk preference; therefore, modeling in the following sections 
of this chapter will support what operating decisions are related to producers’ risk preferences, as 
well as Chapter 5 supporting how risk preferences are related to producers’ operating decisions.  
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4.3 – Model Specification 
As risk preferences are the focal point of this study, modeling was focused on the Risk 
Preferences Score (RPS) variable with the following explanatory variables to determine how 
these variables are related to risk preference. For producer i, the equation explaining risk 
preferences is specified as: 
(2) RPSi = ƒ(AGEi, WAGESi, DARi, ASSETSi, NCOWSi, Hi, Q20Ai, Q20Bi, Q20Hi, ei)  
where ei are random errors and, for producer i, 
 AGEi = Primary operator age 
 WAGESi = Off-farm wages (Thousands) 
 DARi = Debt-to-asset ratio 
 ASSETSi = Total assets (Thousands) 
 NCOWSi = Number of beef cows  
 Hi = Herfindahl index of diversification calculated using shares of total farm income  
 Q20Ai = Dummy variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in analysis and use 
of new technology 
 Q20Bi = Dummy variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in business 
planning skills 
 Q20Hi = Dummy variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in marketing skills 
 
The empirical definitions and expectations of the variables also are described in detail in the 
next section.  
4.4– Definition of Variables 
For this study, data obtained from the KFMA data bank were gathered by association 
economists from each region (See Appendix B for the region and county breakdown of survey 
responses).  The age variable reports the primary operator’s age in 2008. The average age for this 
test group is 55.6 years with a minimum age of 23 and a maximum age of 84. Grable and Lytton 
(1999) assume that investors older in age are naturally less risk preferring than younger 
investors. Therefore, the age variable is expected to have a negative coefficient to show that an 
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increase in a producer’s age will decrease their risk preference score (i.e., older producers are 
more risk averse). This was also tested by Morin (1983) who studied the effect of age on relative 
risk aversion. The overall results indicated that the strength of a person’s risk aversion increase 
with the age of that person. 
The WAGES variable includes all off-farm income of either the operator or operator’s 
spouse. This does not include rent, royalties, stock returns, or other similar forms of income.  
Additional sources of income for a cattleman can be used to provide a cushion for fluctuating 
farm income. The average off-farm income amount in this sample is $14,786.20, with a 
minimum of no off-farm income recorded to a maximum of $170,156.82. Off-farm income 
should have a positive coefficient because as the operator’s off-farm income increases, their RPS 
is expected to increase. In general, the more income a producer has to “play” with, meaning 
more margin for risk, the larger their RPS will be.  
The Debt-to-Asset Ratio (DAR) is calculated as, 
(3)  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
 , 
where i refers to individual producers, DEBT is total liabilities and ASSETS is total assets.  This 
ratio measures the producer’s financial position and reveals to which degree farm debt capital is 
being combined with farm equity capital. The higher the ratio value, the more total capital has 
been supplied by creditors and less by the owner (Langemeier, 2004). The higher the ratio, the 
greater risk will be associated with the operation. Debt ratios of larger than one are of sizeable 
concern because they indicate that the operation could not meet its debt obligations if it sold off 
all of its assets (i.e., the operation is considered insolvent). 
The ASSETS variable is total assets recorded for 2008 for each producer. An asset 
represents farm/ranch property or rights to property such as cash, bank deposits, stocks, or other 
 48 
real estate. The average total assets for the sample of farms was $1,147,691.01 with a minimum 
of $59,658.00 and a maximum of $5,437,793.13. This variable will most likely be positively 
related to RPS because a producer with greater wealth is likely able to afford greater risk.  Morin 
(1983) studied risk aversion within different wealth groups using assets, in which their study 
revealed that the lower the wealth group of the population, the higher the relative risk aversion 
(and conversely, the higher the wealth group, the lower the risk aversion) which coincides with 
the expectation of the assets variable.  Grable and Lytton (2003) used Modern Portfolio Theory 
for the basis of their research in which risk tolerant investors should own a higher proportion of 
high-risk, high expected return assets, ceteris paribus, rather than low-risk, low expected return 
assets. 
The NCOWS variable reports the number of cows owned by each producer in 2008.  The 
average number of cows in this population is 110 cows, with a minimum of three cows and a 
maximum of 650 cows. Similar to assets, the more cows a producer obtains, the higher their RPS 
is expected to be. 
The Herfindahl index of diversification (H) is a measure of the size of firms (income of 
each enterprise) in relation to the net farm income and an indicator of the amount of 
diversification among them. Diversification is another way to reduce the cow-calf producer’s 
exposure to market risk by producing crops in conjunction with beef cattle. The Herfindahl 
diversification measure is calculated by, 
(4)  𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 2𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  , 
where sij is the share of individual producer i’s income generated from enterprise j. In this data 
set, beef, dairy, swine, wheat, corn, grain sorghum, soybeans, and hay forage incomes are each 
used as a separate enterprise (i.e., N=8). The purpose for including each enterprise separately 
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allowed for the Herfindahl index to illustrate the farm’s true distinction of enterprise 
diversification. The share of each enterprise income is squared and summed to equate H. The 
value of H is between 0 and 1; the larger the H value, the less diversified the operation, the 
smaller the H value, the more diversified the operation.  This variable is expected to be 
negatively related to RPS as risk averse producers are expected to be more diversified. 
Lastly, three comparative advantage variables were included in the initial model to 
demonstrate their effect on risk preference. These three comparative advantage choices: analysis 
and use of new technology, business planning skills, and marketing skills, all contain a higher 
amount of perceived risk. All three comparative advantage variables are expected to positively 
affect a producer’s risk preference; when a producer contains a comparative advantage in each 
variable, the higher their RPS is expected to be. 
A key point to note in the discussion of expected signs on coefficients which is related to 
RPS is that the direction of causality of the assumed independent and dependent variables is not 
well established. For example, a highly leveraged producer may be risk averse because of the 
leverage situation, or conversely a risk taker may be willing to take on more debt and thus be 
found to be less risk averse.  Similarly, a highly risk averse producer may diversify his operation 
or a diversified operation may cause a producer to be more risk taking since his risks may be 
offset by diversification.  As can be seen, both the direction of causality and expected sign of a 
pair-wise correlation of RPS with many of the independent variables can be questioned.  The 
purpose of this study is not to determine the direction of causality necessarily, but rather to 
determine the strength of correlations. 
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4.5 – Estimated Equation 
To predict the effect that an increase in operating decisions, as well as other factors, has 
on a producer’s risk preference, equation (2) was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression, which is a technique that compares the relationship between the dependent variable, 
RPS, with the independent variables. The RPS equation estimates how a producer’s risk 
preference is related to a change in many factors, including the variables from the whole farm 
data set, as well as comparative advantages asked in the survey. Table 4.3 gives the correlation 
coefficients of the model’s explanatory variables, and the estimated equation is reported with 
standard errors and significance levels reported in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3 Correlation Coefficients of Explanatory Variables used in OLS Regression Model 
Variable AGE WAGES DAR ASSETS NCOWS H Q20A Q20B Q20H RPS 
AGE 1          
WAGES -0.110 1         
DAR -0.360 -0.014 1        
ASSETS 0.059 -0.121 -0.223 1       
NCOWS -0.065 -0.043 0.062 0.410 1      
H 0.172 0.036 -0.037 -0.135 -0.019 1     
Q20A -0.042 0.019 0.150 0.087 0.059 0.015 1    
Q20B -0.035 -0.056 0.079 0.124 0.118 -0.024 0.035 1   
Q20H 0.013 0.001 0.065 -0.018 0.010 0.024 0.068 0.038 1  
RPS -0.225 -0.091 0.141 0.206 0.208 -0.140 0.077 0.167 -0.020 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
Table 4.4 Risk Preference Score Equation Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors 
Number of Observations Used:  253 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.12 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 33.875 4.668 
AGE -0.201*** 0.070 
WAGES1 -0.039 0.030 
DAR 3.933 3.122 
ASSETS1 0.002*** 0.001 
NCOWS 0.014* 0.009 
H -5.009 3.996 
Q20A 0.968** 1.571 
Q20B 3.306 1.720 
Q20H -0.797 1.763 
1Reported in thousands of dollars ($) 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Although some of the coefficients are not easily interpreted, expected signs and 
significance levels can be discussed. The adjusted R-Square is 0.12 and half of the variables are 
statistically significant at the given level (1%, 5%, or 10% level) shown in Table 4.4. The age 
parameter estimate shows that as an operator gets older, their risk preference tends to decrease. 
This coincides with research by Grable and Lytton (1999).   
An operator’s assets and number of cows owned affect their risk preference positively 
showing that the more assets and cows a producer has in possession, the larger their risk 
preference.  This too coincides with the anticipated expectations, seeing that as a producer 
operation size increases, all else constant, they are willing to take on greater risk to enhance 
income potential.  
The remaining variable shown to affect a producer’s risk preference score was the binary 
variable of the producer’s comparative advantage in analysis and use of new technology (Q20A). 
This can be interpreted as producers who consider themselves to have a comparative advantage 
in their use of new technology are likely innovators who are willing to take on new ventures and 
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face greater risk. This assessment appears adequate and can show to be related to the assets 
variable in that, producers who have the ability to manage and organize use of new technology 
have the knowledge and opportunity to gain more assets and generally prefer more risk. Other 
items, such as off-farm income, debt-to-asset ratio, farm diversification, and comparative 
advantages in business planning and marketing skills were found to not influence the risk 
preference score among producers as they were not significant at the 10% level.  
  
4.6 – Sensitivity Analysis 
To compare and analyze how the risk preference model is working and how operating 
decision factors are affecting a producer’s preference of their risk-taking practices, sensitivity 
analysis was completed in three models, each concentrating on three specific areas: financial 
soundness of the operator, production practices of the operator, and marketing methods specific 
to retained ownership management practices. The three equations (5, 6 and 7) are listed as: 
(subscript i is dropped for notational convenience) 
Financial Soundness: 
(5) RPS = ƒ(AGE, WAGES, DAR, ASSETS, NCOWS, H, Q20A, Q20B, Q20H, Q20E, 
Q21N, Q22D, e) 
where, 
 Q20E = Comparative Advantages – Loan and interest rate management  
 Q21N = General risk factors to cow operations – Credit availability  
 Q22D = Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – Maintaining financial/credit 
reserves  
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Production Practices: 
(6) RPS = ƒ(AGE, WAGES, DAR, ASSETS, NCOWS, H, Q20A, Q20B, Q20H, Q24A, 
Q24B, Q24C, Q24D, Q24E, Q24F, Q24G, Q24H, Q24I, Q24J, e) 
where, 
 Q24A = Cow-calf herd most important part of income  
 Q24B = Economy has focused attention on financial mgmt  
 Q24C = Economy has focused attention on marketing  
 Q24D = Economy has focused attention on intensive herd mgmt  
 Q24E = Individually ID is critical to operation  
 Q24F = Would participate in value-added programs to increase returns  
 Q24G = Disease prevention is important in cattle herd 
 Q24H = Consult with vet for health program   
 Q24I = Inspect herd at least twice weekly  
 Q24J = BCS of cows is important  
 
Retained Ownership: 
(7) RPS = ƒ(AGE, WAGES, DAR, ASSETS, NCOWS, H, Q20A, Q20B, Q20H, Q2A, Q3C, 
Q3G, Q4B, Q6A, Q6B, Q6C, Q6D, Q6E, Q22E, Q23E, e) 
where, 
 Q2A = Participation in production management program – Retain Ownership of 
Calves  
 Q3C = Typical management of steers after weaning – Retain through finishing  
 Q3G = Typical management of heifers after weaning  – Retain through finishing 
Q6A = Reason to Retain Ownership – Risk worthwhile  
 Q6B = Reason to Retain Ownership – Performance data  
 Q6C = Reason to Retain Ownership – Carcass data  
 Q6D = Reason to Retain Ownership – Genetic/value-added improvement  
 Q6E = Reason to Retain Ownership – Other 
 Q22E = Risk factors that affect farm/ranch income – Retaining calves for market 
timing  
 Q23E = Manage farm/ranch income volatility – Utilizing marketing methods to 
sell calves 
 
The estimated equations of the accompanying variables and their effects on the model are 
described in detail in the next section.  
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4.7 – Estimated Equations 
To predict the effect that additional factors related to a financial strength of a producer 
have on their risk preference, equations (5), (6), and (7) were estimated using OLS regression.  
Table 4.5 gives the parameter estimates and standard error for equation (5) on financial 
soundness, and conducts sensitivity analysis to see what affects the model. 
Table 4.5 Financial Soundness Parameter Estimates and Standard Error 
Number of Observations: 249 
Adjusted R-Square:0.13   
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 40.751*** 5.842 
AGE -0.215*** 0.071 
WAGES -0.038 0.029 
DAR 5.350* 3.259 
ASSETS 0.002** 0.001 
NCOWS 0.015* 0.009 
H -4.234 4.038 
Q20A 0.904 1.572 
Q20B 4.178*** 1.747 
Q20H -1.086 1.827 
Q20E 1.469 1.463 
Q21N -0.606 0.749 
Q22D -1.488* 0.864 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The only new variable to influence this model on producer financial strength is the 
importance of maintaining financial/credit reserves (Q22D).  This significant variable shows as 
the more important maintaining financial/credit reserves is to a producer, the smaller their risk 
preference. This can be compared with operator age, where the older a producer gets, the less 
risk preferring they become. Older investors are essentially less risk tolerant and invest less of 
their assets in equities and more in fixed income securities (Grable, 1999).  The adjusted R-
square (ARS) is only improved slightly from the original model at 0.13. The Debt-to-Asset ratio 
(DAR) and comparative advantage in business planning skills (Q20B) variables in the new model 
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became statistically significant, where they were not statistically significant in the original 
model. This change showed that as a producer’s debt-to-asset ratio and encompassing a 
comparative advantage in business skills increases, their RPS will increase.  
The next model that performs sensitivity analysis uses additional production practices by 
operators to help determine how they are related to risk aversion. Table 4.6 gives the parameter 
estimates and standard errors.  
Table 4.6 Production Practices Parameter Estimates and Standard Error 
Number of Observations: 241 
Adjusted R-Square:0.16   
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 42.781*** 6.518 
AGE -0.176*** 0.075 
WAGES -0.048 0.030 
DAR 3.624 3.227 
ASSETS 0.001 0.001 
NCOWS 0.011 0.010 
H -7.370* 4.335 
Q20A 0.634 1.630 
Q20B 4.389*** 1.810 
Q20H -0.460 1.883 
Q24A -0.447 0.747 
Q24B 1.921 1.360 
Q24C -1.413 1.200 
Q24D -1.096 1.147 
Q24E 0.001 0.903 
Q24F 2.824*** 1.065 
Q24G -3.550*** 1.403 
Q24H 0.767 1.052 
Q24I -0.471 0.869 
Q24J -0.400 1.213 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The two production practice variables included in the new model that affect the 
producer’s RPS are participation in value-added programs (Q24F) and disease prevention 
(Q24G) being an important part of their management practice. The more a producer participates 
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in value-added programs to increase returns in their operation, the larger their RPS. This is a 
viable result as value-added programs, such as a certified feeder cattle program or a product 
specified feed cattle program for example, cause the producer to invest more into their cattle to 
gamble a higher net return. Conversely, the more important disease prevention is to a producer’s 
cow herd, the smaller their RPS.  This too is a feasible end result as producers who are more risk 
averse will not stake any health consequence to their herd, thus risking less to allow disease into 
their herd.  Risk preferring producers, for example may take the chance to purchase less vaccines 
which prevent disease. This model’s adjusted R-square (ARS) has increase additionally to 0.16, 
from 0.12 in the original model, to show an improved measure of fit of the explanatory variables. 
The producer total assets (ASSETS) and number of cows owned (NCOWS) variables in the new 
model became statistically insignificant, compared to the original model, and the farm 
diversification (H) variable became statistically significant at the 10% level.  As the producer’s 
diversification in farm enterprises decreases (becomes less diversified), the lower their RPS will 
be.  
The third model that executes sensitivity analysis looks at marketing practices, yet 
specifically at the retained ownership form of marketing post-weaned calves. Table 4.7 gives the 
parameter estimates and standard errors. 
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Table 4.7 Retained Ownership Parameter Estimates and Standard Error 
Number of Observations: 183 
Adjusted R-Square:0.21 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 37.375*** 6.952 
AGE -0.171** 0.081 
WAGES -0.054 0.035 
DAR 0.705 3.575 
ASSETS 0.001 0.001 
NCOWS 0.011 0.011 
H -7.093 5.121 
Q20A 0.020 1.812 
Q20B 1.702 2.042 
Q20H -0.987 2.183 
Q2A 0.841 2.099 
Q3C 0.957 1.264 
Q3G 0.650 1.188 
Q4B -0.031 0.024 
Q6A -1.392 2.144 
Q6B 7.375** 3.342 
Q6C -6.010* 3.725 
Q6D 6.109** 3.062 
Q6E -8.450** 4.319 
Q22E -0.561 1.024 
Q23E -0.037 2.028 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
The process of retained ownership is analyzed more thoroughly because by extending the 
production process into integrated stocker and/or feedlot stages, cow-calf producers may reduce 
uncertainty in face of changing price levels for two reasons, according to Murphy (1991): 1) 
price variability normally decreases as the production stage approaches the slaughter stage, and 
2) delayed selling provides an opportunity for price recovery if prices are currently unfavorable. 
First, a question used from the survey that asked a producer, “If they DO retain ownership, 
why?”, had five possible responses where respondents could check all that applied.  Four of the 
five answer choices tested to affect risk preference.  First, producers who receive performance 
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data while calves are on feed (i.e., rate of gain, average weights, etc.), and those who get a return 
for genetic improvements or value-added investments, tend to have a larger preference for risk. 
Conversely, producers who receive carcass data information, or retain ownership for another 
reason, tend to have a smaller RPS. This model reports the largest ARS of all models analyzed. 
This model’s ARS was 0.21, improved from 0.12 in the original model, showing a more 
developed model with a better fit of the data. The producer total assets (ASSETS), number of 
cows owned (NCOWS), and comparative advantage in business planning skills (Q20B) variables 
in the new model became statistically insignificant, compared to the original model.  
4.8 – Results  
This chapter tested how operation and operator characteristics, as well as operating 
decisions, relate to Kansas cow-calf producers’ risk preferences. We found that the mainstream 
of producers (49.6%) are risk averse, and the second greatest population of producers (36.0%) 
ranked at having a moderate low risk preference.  Only 2.6% of producers ranked as high risk 
preferring.  When risk preferences were compared to producers’ risk preference scores, operator 
age, total assets, number of cows owned, and having a comparative advantage in business 
planning skills all had an effect.  
When the model was run to show explanatory variables to affect RPS, age of operator, 
assets owned, number of cows in herd and a comparative advantage in business planning skills 
all had an effect on the relationship with a producer’s risk preference.  
In order to correctly determine what operating decisions affect a producer’s risk 
preference, sensitivity analysis was run on financial strength of the producer, production 
practices, and marketing methods, specifically on retained ownership, where more variables were 
revealed to have a statistical relation to RPS. These variables include: maintaining 
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financial/credit reserves, participating in value-added programs to increase returns in their 
operation, the importance of disease prevention to a producer’s cow herd, and reasons to retain 
ownership such as receiving performance or carcass data, receiving a return for genetic 
improvement for value-added investments as well as other reasons to retain, all affected the 
producer’s risk aversion. The next chapter will investigate how risk preferences affect producer 
management and marketing practices.   
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CHAPTER 5 - Risk Aversion Affecting Management and Marketing 
Practices:  Model Specifications 
5.1 – Introduction 
 This chapter describes analysis to determine how a producer’s risk aversion 
affects their management and marketing practices.  Specifically, the following models are broken 
into the same three groups as analyzed in the sensitivity analysis section of Chapter 4: 1) 
financial soundness of the producer, 2) production practices, and 3) marketing methods specific 
to retained ownership. First, Section 5.2 describes the two model frameworks used for analyzing 
data: binary and ordered logit models. Section 5.3 develops models for how maintained 
financial/credit reserves and price risk are affected by risk preference. Section 5.4 analyzes 
models on production practices, such as herd size changes, maintaining animal health, 
purchasing insurance and culling decisions including the effect of a producer risk aversion on 
each.  The third factor of marketing methods is looked at in Section 5.5, with specific interest in 
how producer risk aversion affects retained ownership decisions.   
5.2 – Empirical Modeling for Binary and Ordered Logit Models 
First, binary logit modeling was used to analyze responses to survey questions where “1” 
or “0” or “Yes” or “No” was reported in answer to a question. A binary logit model determines 
factors affecting the probability that a producer would check “1” or “Yes”, as well as the 
probability that a producer would check the opposite, “0” or “No”.  For example, when a binary 
dependent variable is used, it is defined as yi = 1 if the producer would circle “Yes” and yi = 0 if 
the producer circled “No”. An empirical representation of the binary logit model is (Greene, 
2003): 
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(1) Prob(yi = 1) = F(x,β), 
where the x’s are explanatory variables and β’s are parameters to be estimated. The i refers to 
individual producers.  Define: 
(2) E(𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅│𝑥𝑥) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽) 
 F(x,β) = β’x 
then the regression model can be estimated as: 
(3) 𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 =  (𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥) +  (𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 −  𝐷𝐷(𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥))  
     =  𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥 +  𝜀𝜀 
The error, ε, is logistically distributed; therefore, the probability of yi  = 1 can be denoted 
as: 
(4) Prob(yi = 1) = 
11+exp⁡(−𝛽𝛽′ 𝑥𝑥) 
The marginal effects can be calculated by: 
(5)  𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷(𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅|𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
=  𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒⁡(𝛽𝛽′ 𝑥𝑥)(1+𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 (𝛽𝛽′ 𝑥𝑥))2 ∗  𝛽𝛽 
Individual equations are specifically set up in the following sections which will describe 
each model in more detail. 
To analyze a survey question that used 3 or more answer choices, an ordered logit model 
was utilized, in which the empirical representation (Greene, 2003) is: 
(6) yi* = x’i β + εi , 
where i refers to producers, yi* is an unobservable variable linearly dependent on the explanatory 
variables, x, and ε is random error. The random error is assumed to be logistically distributed, 
i.e., F(εi) = 
𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏+𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞⁡(−𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊) . Survey responses observed, yi , are based on yi*: 
(7) yi = 𝟏𝟏 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗  ≤ ƞ𝟏𝟏 
(8) yi = 𝟐𝟐 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊ƞ𝟏𝟏 < 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ ≤ ƞ𝟐𝟐 
(9) yi = 𝟑𝟑 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊ƞ𝟐𝟐 < 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ ≤ ƞ𝟑𝟑 .  . .  .  .  .  
(10) yi = 𝑱𝑱 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊ƞ𝑱𝑱−𝟏𝟏 < 𝒚𝒚𝟏𝟏∗  , 
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where the thresholds, ƞ𝒌𝒌 , are unknown values that are estimated along with the β coefficients 
and J is the number of categories. As it is assumed that the error is logistically distributed, the 
following probabilities hold: 
Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(x’iβ + εi ≤ ƞ𝟏𝟏 
= 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ1) 
Prob(yi = 2) = Prob(x’iβ + εi ≤ ƞ𝟐𝟐 - Prob(x’iβ + εi ≤ ƞ𝟏𝟏  
= 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ2) - 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ1) 
Prob(yi = 3) = Prob(x’iβ + εi ≤ ƞ𝟑𝟑 - Prob(x’iβ + εi ≤ ƞ𝟐𝟐  
= 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ3) - 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ2) 
. . . 
Prob(yi = J) = Prob(ƞ𝑱𝑱−𝟏𝟏 ≤ x’iβ + εi ) 
 
=1- 11+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥′ 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽−ƞ𝑗𝑗−1) . 
The marginal effects associated with the probabilities can be shown as: 
(12)  𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 (𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅=𝐽𝐽
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅
𝐽𝐽 =  −𝛽𝛽𝐽𝐽  � exp (𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅′ 𝛽𝛽− ƞ𝐽𝐽 )(1+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅′ 𝛽𝛽− ƞ𝐽𝐽 ))2 − exp (𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅′ 𝛽𝛽− ƞ𝐽𝐽−1)(1+exp⁡(𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅′ 𝛽𝛽− ƞ𝐽𝐽−1))2 �, 
where ƞ0=-∞ and ƞJ=∞. 
 The following sections will elucidate which type of model is being run, 
expectations, model specifications, and results. 
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5.3 – Financial Strength Affected by Risk Aversion: Model Specifications 
Financial and price risk are an even bigger concern to producers than production risks 
(Murphy, 1991).  Managing these price risks, such as fluctuating cattle prices and alternatives to 
marketing calves, are analyzed in this section. Additionally, we look at how producers consider 
the importance of their financial position compared to their personal risk preference.  The sub-
sections that follow compare risk preferences to producers’ maintenance of financial/credit 
reserves, and if they purchase insurance to manage farm/ranch income volatility, as well as 
specifically looking at price risk with marketing methods.  
5.3.1 – Maintaining Financial/Credit Reserves Empirical Model 
Nearly three-quarters of respondents (74.5%) agree or strongly agree that maintaining 
financial/credit reserves as a risk factor affecting their farm/ranch income is important to them.  
As maintaining financial/credit reserves importance was modeled in Chapter 4 as an explanatory 
variable compared to the risk preference variable, the results demonstrated that the more 
important maintaining financial/credit reserves is to a producer, the smaller their risk preference 
tends to be.  
Survey responses to the question were ranked from 1 to 5, where 1 indicated not 
important and 5 indicated very important with the three middle rankings being in between the 
two extremes. The ordered logit model (explained in equations (6) through (12)) for maintaining 
financial/credit reserves is defined as (subscript i is dropped for notational convenience): 
(13) Q22D = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
 
where maintaining financial/credit reserves (Q22D) is the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are defined as: 
 RPS = Producer risk preference score 
 AGE = Primary operator age 
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 WAGES = Off-farm wages (Thousands) 
 DAR = Debt-to-asset ratio 
 ASSETS = Total assets (Thousands) 
 NCOWS = Number of beef cows  
 H = Herfindahl index of diversification calculated using shares of total farm income  
 Q20A = Binary variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in analysis and 
use of new technology 
 Q20B = Binary variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in business 
planning skills 
 Q20H = Binary variable  to show producer’s comparative advantage in marketing 
skills 
 
The age of operator (age) and debt-to-asset ratio (DAR) are expected to increase the 
importance of maintaining credit reserves to producers. The older a producer, the more likely 
they are to view maintaining their savings as important.  As a producer’s debt-to-asset ratio 
increases (becomes a highly debt leveraged operation) the more total liabilities a producer 
possesses, thus, the more important savings are in order to compensate for their debts. The 
producer’s off-farm income (wages) and total assets (assets) are expected to decrease the 
importance of maintaining credit reserves to producers. The more assets a producer possesses, as 
well as the more off-farm income generated, the less likely having credit reserves is important to 
producers. This can be explained as producers who tend to have more assets and off-farm income 
already have additional capital and are less worried about reserving extra savings.  
Functionally, for this model to show a relationship with the producer’s risk tolerance, the 
risk preference score (RPS) variable was included to show if a producer who prefers more or less 
risk will view savings as important in terms of their farm/ranch income.  As risk preference 
(RPS) increases the producer is expected to view maintaining credit reserves as less important. 
The more risk preferring (or less risk averse) a producer becomes, the less likely they are to view 
maintaining credit reserves as important, simply because of their risk tolerance.  The number of 
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cows variable (NCOWS) and farm diversification (H) can be viewed from both sides. The more 
cows owned by a producer and the more diverse in enterprise income, the more likely they may 
view maintaining savings as important, or they could view it as less important.  The binary 
variables can be viewed in the same light. Producers who consider themselves to have a 
comparative advantage in new technology, business planning skills and marketing skills, could 
view maintaining savings as important to contribute to their comparative advantage. On the other 
hand, they could view maintaining savings as not important merely because of their comparative 
advantages.  
5.3.2 – Estimated Equation and Results 
An ordered logit model was used to estimate the parameters in equation (13) to determine 
how the different explanatory variables relate to the probability of the producer’s response of 
maintaining financial/credit reserves being of importance to their farm/ranch income, and are 
reported in Table 5.1. Changes in probabilities associated with a one-unit change in each 
explanatory variable were calculated and are referred to as marginal probabilities, based on 
equation (12). Marginal probabilities sum to zero across rows because as the probability of one 
response choice category increases, all others must decrease collectively by that same amount.  
Binary variables do not have marginal probabilities as they only take on values of one or zero. 
Accordingly, the probabilities, based on equation (11), as binary independent variables change 
from 0 to 1 are also presented in Table 5.1. The probabilities associated with changes in the 
binary variables were calculated by holding continuous variables at their average values and 
discrete variables at zero.  
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Table 5.1 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Rate "Maintaining 
Financial/Credit Reserves" in Terms of Importance That Affects Farm/Ranch Income. (1 = 
Not Important to 5 = Very Important) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 5.1957 <.0001 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 -0.2462 0.3777 0.0207 0.0458 0.2180 0.5611 0.1544 
new technology = 0 Default 0.0162 0.0365 0.1844 0.5735 0.1894 
        
business planning skills 
= 1 0.2603 0.3958 0.0126 0.0286 0.1521 0.5741 0.2326 
business planning skills 
= 0 Default 0.0162 0.0365 0.1844 0.5735 0.1894 
        
marketing skills = 1 -0.7091 0.0254 0.0325 0.0692 0.2855 0.5097 0.1031 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.0162 0.0365 0.1844 0.5735 0.1894 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS -0.0249 0.0302 0.0004 0.0008 0.0033 -0.0007 -0.0038 
Age -0.0106 0.4087 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0016 
Wages -0.0009 0.8655 1.44E-05 3.07E-05 0.0001 -2.48E-05 -0.0001 
DAR 0.7590 0.1650 -0.0121 -0.0258 -0.0994 0.0208 0.1165 
Assets 0.0001 0.4664 -2.06E-06 -4.39E-06 -1.69E-05 3.53E-06 1.98E-05 
Ncows -0.0012 0.4244 1.99E-05 4.24E-05 0.0002 -3.42E-05 -0.0002 
H -0.1461 0.8323 0.0023 0.0050 0.0191 -0.0040 -0.0224 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -286.84559 Number of Observations Used = 249     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  1.216 (0.0014), Limit 3:  2.9356 (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  5.558 (<.0001) 
 
Holding other factors constant, the probability that a producer who feels they have a 
comparative advantage in marketing skills and view maintaining savings as important (response 
of 4 and higher), was 61.3%.  However, those who do not have a comparative advantage in 
marketing skills have a probability of 76.3% of having a response of 4 and higher. Therefore, 
producers who believe they have a comparative advantage in marketing skills tend to place 
greater importance on maintaining credit reserves. Comparative advantages in new technology 
and business planning skills were not related to desire to maintain credit reserves.  
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Risk preference was the only continuous variable to affect the producer’s view of 
importance in terms of maintaining financial/credit reserves. The probability of a producer 
viewing their savings as important (response of 4 and 5), increases as the risk preference of that 
producer decreases (becomes more risk averse), all else constant. So, as a producer becomes 
more risk averse, the importance of keeping savings or possessing financial strength increases 
(Figure 5.1). Furthermore, the probability of a producer’s importance of financial reserves being 
neutral (response of 3) or of little to no importance (response of 1 and 2), increases as their risk 
tolerance increases.  Therefore, there is a tendency for a producer who is willing to take risks to 
be less concerned with maintaining their financial/credit reserves. Figure 5.1 shows a 
relationship between risk preference and expected probability of maintaining financial/credit 
reserves, which is decreasing at a decreasing rate. 
Figure 5.1 Expected Probability of Risk Preference Affecting Importance of Maintaining 
Financial/Credit Reserves in Terms of Farm/Ranch Income 
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5.3.3 – Purchasing Insurance Empirical Model  
Many producers purchase insurance as a form of risk mitigation in their operations. 
Producers in Kansas can take advantage of Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) and crop insurance 
of some form to help them manage their farm/ranch income volatility. LRP is a federal insurance 
program managed by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). It protects livestock producers from 
price declines, and the feeder cattle option offers cow-calf producers and stocker and 
backgrounding operators the ability to buy insurance against a decline in the CME Feeder Cattle 
Index (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2009). Almost all of the cow-calf producers in Kansas 
who responded to the survey (98.9%) also have crops. In 2008 alone, Kansas farmers had 
16,500,103 net acres insured of insurable crops (2008 Kansas Crop Insurance Profile). Looking 
at this, it can be hypothesized that most producers purchase insurance to manage their farm/ranch 
income volatility.  The specific type of insurance was not mentioned in the survey instrument, 
but producers could report “yes” or “no” to purchasing insurance to manage their farm/ranch 
income volatility.  
In order to analyze this response, a binary logit model was used to determine factors 
affecting the probability that a producer would purchase insurance.  A binary dependent variable 
was used and defined as yi = 1 if the producer would purchase insurance and yi = 0 if the producer 
did not purchase insurance. An empirical representation of the binary logit model is shown in 
Section 5.2 in equations (1) through (5), and the model for purchasing insurance is defined as: 
(14) Q23A = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where Q23A is the question variable asking whether or not a producer purchases insurance and 
the other explanatory variables are the same as defined in Section 5.3.1. 
 69 
This RPS variable was expected to show a negative relationship, meaning that as the 
producer’s RPS increases (becomes more risk preferring), the operator will be less likely to 
purchase insurance.  Risk-averse individuals should always prefer buying insurance as they 
prefer a sure outcome, whereas a risk preferring person would prefer a gamble (Slovic, 1977). 
This relationship may also hold true for off-farm income (WAGES), the debt-to-asset ratio 
(DAR), and farm income diversification (H). The more off-farm income a producer has, the 
higher the debt-to-asset ratio, and the more diversified in production, the less probable a 
producer will purchase insurance. According to relevant research, the number of cows owned 
(NCOWS) should be a negative value showing that as the number of cows owned increases, the 
less probable a producer will purchase insurance. A study by Mahul (2007), showed that cattle 
producers with herd sizes smaller than the average were the primary purchasers of the insurance 
programs being provided in the study. Additionally, a producer reveals his risk tendencies by 
how much insurance he or she purchases (MacCrimmon, 1985). 
Operator age (AGE), and farm size (ASSETS) were expected to show a positive 
relationship because as the operator’s age and the farm size increased, the more probable a 
producer will purchase insurance.  If it is assumed that a producer who prefers less risk will be 
more probable to purchase insurance; then older producers will be more probable to purchase 
insurance, along with those who own more cattle and whose farm size is larger. The binary 
variables can be viewed from both sides. Producers who consider themselves to have a 
comparative advantage in new technology, business planning skills, and marketing skills, could 
be more likely to purchase insurance to contribute to their comparative advantage. On the 
contrary, they could be less likely to purchase insurance simply because of their comparative 
advantages.  
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5.3.4 – Estimated Equation and Results 
A binary logit model was used to estimate the parameters in equation (14) to determine 
how the different explanatory (independent) variables relate to the probability of a producer 
purchasing insurance to manage their farm/ranch income volatility.  Model estimation results are 
reported in Table 5.1. Changes in probabilities related with a one-unit change in each 
explanatory variable were calculated and are referred to as marginal probabilities, based on 
equation (6). Marginal probabilities were calculated based on the average survey respondent 
responses with respect to a one-unit change in each explanatory variable.  Binary variables in the 
model do not have marginal probabilities because they only take on values of one or zero, thus 
the probabilities as binary variables change from 0 to 1 are presented in Table 5.2 and were 
calculated using equation (5). The probabilities associated with changes in the binary variables 
were calculated by holding all other variables at their average values, and analyzing at the default 
at 0, ceteris paribus, when changing one binary variable from 0 to 1. 
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Table 5.2 Binary Logit Estimates for the Probability of Managing Farm/Ranch Income by 
Purchasing Insurance (1 = Yes, Purchase Insurance; 0 = No, Do Not Purchase Insurance) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 0 1 
Intercept 0.1616 0.8700 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.1988 0.5070 0.6360 0.3640 
new technology = 0 Default  0.6800 0.3200 
     
business planning skills = 1 0.6484 0.0463 0.5270 0.4730 
business planning skills = 0 Default  0.6800 0.3200 
     
marketing skills = 1 0.2110 0.5309 0.6330 0.3670 
marketing skills = 0 Default  0.6800 0.3200 
   
Marginal Probability             
(at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0077 0.5281 0.0016 
Age -0.0202 0.1425 -0.0042 
Wages -8.25E-06 0.1935 -1.72E-06 
DAR 0.3707 0.5342 0.0772 
Assets 2.04E-07 0.2523 4.25E-08 
Ncows -0.0032 0.0777 -0.0007 
H 0.3357 0.6643 0.0699 
     
Number of Observations Used = 253    
Percent Concordant = 64.0%     
Percent Discordant = 35.5%         
  
The three binary variables are for those producers who consider themselves to have a 
comparative advantage in analysis and use of new technology, business planning skills and 
marketing skills. Producers who consider themselves to have comparative advantage in business 
planning skills are 47.3% probable to purchase insurance, ceteris paribus; whereas the other two 
comparative advantage variables (new technology and marketing skills) did not have an effect on 
the model because they were not statistically significant. Those that do not have a comparative 
advantage in these factors are 32.0% probable of purchasing insurance.  Therefore, producers are 
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more probable to purchase insurance if they possess a comparative advantage in business 
planning skills. 
As the number of cows owned by a producer increases in size (head), the probability of 
purchasing insurance will decrease. Figure 5.2 shows this relationship: as the number of head of 
cattle owned increases, the probability of purchasing insurance decreases. A producer who owns 
10 head of cattle has a 36.7% probability of purchasing insurance; whereas, a producer who 
owns 650 head of cattle has a 6.8% probability of purchasing insurance. This result was 
consistent with expectations, as well as coinciding with Mahul’s (2007) research. Risk 
preference was not found to influence the purchasing of income among producers as it was not 
significant at the 10% level. Other items, such as age of operator, off-farm income, debt-to-asset 
ratio, farm size, and farm diversification were also statistically insignificant.  Figure 5.2 shows a 
slightly non-linear relationship between number of cows owned and expected probability of 
purchasing insurance at a decreasing rate. 
The percent concordant and discordant is reported in Table 5.2. These items show the fit 
of the binary logit model. A pair of observations with different observed responses is assumed to 
be concordant if the observation with the lower ordered response value (Purchasing Insurance = 
0) has a lower predicted mean score than the observation with the higher ordered response value 
(Purchasing Insurance = 1). The total number of pairs are the distinct pairs with one case having 
a positive response (Purchasing Insurance = 1) and the other having a negative response 
(Purchasing Insurance = 0). If the observation with the lower ordered response value has a higher 
predicted mean score than the observation with the higher ordered response value, then the pair 
is discordant (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group). This model was 65.0% concordant, and 
35.5% discordant.  
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Figure 5.2 Number of Head Owned and Probability of a Producer Purchasing Insurance  
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5.3.5 – Economic Instability Focusing Attention to Financial Management Empirical 
Model 
It is important to look at how producers are responding and making decisions during 
unstable economic situations. At the time this survey was conducted, the feeder cattle (500-600 
lbs) price was around $112/cwt when the 5-year average was  $134/cwt and all of the reported 
monthly prices for 2008 were lower than 2009 (USDA & James Mintert, K-State Ag 
Economics). This situation was the same for 700-800 lb feeder steers, slaughter, and boxed beef 
prices. The economy as a whole was also unstable as recession set in, the stock market plunged, 
unemployment rates increased and bailouts occurred for major industries. This specific survey 
question was asked to see if this instability has caused producers to focus more of their attention 
to their personal financial management and is described as: 
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(15) Q24B = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where Q24B is the question variable asking if recent economic instability has focused the 
producer’s attention on more careful financial management, and the other explanatory variables 
are the same as defined in Section 5.3.1. 
 A producer’s risk preference can be looked at from both sides. If a producer prefers more 
risk (less risk averse) they could be more probable to focus their attention on more careful 
financial management because of their risk tolerance. However, producers who are more risk 
averse may also be more probable to focus their attention on financial management because it is 
a form of risk aversion management.  The debt-to-asset ratio can be viewed similarly. As a 
producer’s debt-to-asset ratio increases (becomes highly debt leveraged), the probability of that 
producer agreeing that they focus their attention on more careful financial management will 
decrease.  If their past financial management action had been more of an importance to them, 
their DAR should be a low value. However, if their DAR is a higher value, the probability of the 
producer focusing their attention on more careful financial management could increase because 
their ratio is a high level and the recent economic instability may change their focus in this 
direction. 
All other variables are expected to  positively affect the dependent variable in that as age 
of operator, off-farm income, assets, number of cows, diversification, new technology, business 
planning and marketing skills are expected to increase, the probability of that producer indicating 
that they focus their attention on more careful financial management will increase.  
5.3.6 – Estimated Equation and Results 
An ordered logit model was again used to estimate the parameters in equation (15) to 
determine how the different explanatory variables relate to the probability of the producer’s 
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indicated they were focusing more attention on careful financial management, which is reported 
in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Recent Economic Instability 
Has Focused My Attention on More Careful Financial Management in My Operation. (1 = 
Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 2.4632 0.0716  Probabilities  
new technology = 1 0.2956 0.3177 
      
0.0028        0.0384  
      
0.1910        0.6485        0.1193  
new technology = 0 Default 
      
0.0038        0.0508  
      
0.2343        0.6195        0.0916  
        
business planning 
skills = 1 0.4989 0.1285 
      
0.0023        0.0316  
      
0.1640        0.6597        0.1424  
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 
      
0.0038        0.0508  
      
0.2343        0.6195        0.0916  
        
marketing skills = 1 -0.1970 0.5504 
      
0.0047        0.0611  
      
0.2653        0.5925        0.0764  
marketing skills = 0 Default 
      
0.0038        0.0508  
      
0.2343        0.6195        0.0916  
        
    Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0)  
RPS 0.0008 0.9457 -2.99E-06 -3.76E-05 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Age 0.0340 0.0106 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0052 0.0042 0.0028 
Wages 0.0017 0.7489 -6.45E-06 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
DAR 1.3784 0.0182 -0.0052 -0.0660 -0.2120 0.1686 0.1146 
Assets -2.75E-05 0.8704 1.05E-07 1.31E-06 4.23E-06 -3.36E-06 -2.29E-06 
Ncows 0.0008 0.6200 -3.12E-06 -3.92E-05 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
H 1.6547 0.0247 -0.0063 -0.0792 -0.2545 0.2024 0.1376 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -256.30671 Number of Observations Used = 251     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  2.7125 (0.0051), Limit 3:  4.6629 (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  7.8579 (<.0001). 
 
None of the three comparative advantages affected the producer’s decision to focus their 
attention on more careful financial management, but age of the operator, debt-to-asset ratio, and 
farm diversification did have an effect.  As the age of the operator increased, the probability of 
them agreeing to become more focused on financial management (response of 4 and higher) was 
a small 0.7%.  However, the probability of a producer’s attitude of focusing on more careful 
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financial management being neutral (response of 3) or disagreeing (response of 1 and 2), 
decreases as the age of the operator increases. Thus, older producers tend to view that recent 
economic instability has focused their attention on more careful financial management in their 
operation.  
The debt-to-asset ratio was also related in that, the probability that a producer indicated 
they were more focused on financial management (response of 4 and 5) as their DAR increases, 
was 28.3%. Figure 5.3 shows that as a producer’s debt-to-asset ratio increases, the more probable 
they are to focus their attention on better financial management. Additionally, as the DAR 
increases, the less probable a producer’s attitude was neutral (response of 3) or disagreeing 
(response of 1 and 2) in terms of their attitude on financial management.  Thus, producers who 
have a high DAR have a greater risk associated with the operation, and might be expected to be 
focusing more attention on their financial management practices, whereas producers with a lower 
DAR do not need to focus as much attention in this area as they are more financially stable. 
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Figure 5.3 Debt-to-Asset Ratio and Probability of Focusing Attention on Financial 
Management 
 
 
Lastly, the farm diversification variable was related to the producer’s focus on financial 
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diversification index and expected probability of focusing attention on financial management, 
which is increasing at a decreasing rate. Overall, as farms become less diversified in terms of the 
operator’s enterprise incomes (H gets larger), producers become more likely to view the 
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Figure 5.4 Farm Diversification and Probability of Focusing Attention on Financial 
Management 
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5.3.7 – Pricing Methods Empirical Model 
The fourth and final model compared under this section of operator financial strength is 
how risk aversion affects practices of specific cattle pricing methods. Since the mainstream of 
respondents (90%) signified they use cash-only pricing methods to sell their calves annually, this 
dependent variable will be analyzed to determine how a producer’s risk preference affects their 
decision to sell their calves with the cash-only option. Respondents reported their total 
percentage use of all pricing methods from 0 to 100. They chose between the given options of 
forward contracting or marketing agreement, futures hedging, futures options, cash only, and 
other, where the total pricing methods used summed to 100 percent. This model will be defined 
as: 
(15) Q5D = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
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where explanatory variables are same as defined in Section 5.3.1.   
Risk preference is expected to affect the use of cash-only pricing methods in that, as RPS 
increases, the use of cash-only pricing decreases. Producers who are more risk averse are more 
likely to use cash only as it is a less uncertain option for selling calves.  It is expected that age 
and the debt-to-asset ratio will affect the use of cash-only pricing in that, as the age of the 
operator and their debt-to-asset ratio increases, the more likely the producer is to use a cash-only 
pricing method. The older a producer, the more risk averse they become and will thus be more 
likely to use cash only. Additionally, if a producer has a high DAR, they most likely will take the 
less risky option and use cash only as it is a chance to receive cash immediately, without having 
to risk any more debts. 
As off-farm income, assets, number of cows owned and the three comparative 
advantages: new technology, business planning skills and marketing skills, increase, the less 
likely the producer will use a cash-only pricing method.  Producers who have a higher off-farm 
income and possess more assets are less likely to use cash only as they will be more willing to 
venture a more risky pricing method because they have the additional capital to offset if the 
pricing methods do not perform to their advantage. The more head of cattle owned by a 
producer, the more likely they are to participate in a marketing or futures agreement instead of 
cash only because they can use herd-size numbers to their benefit. Lastly, a producer who has a 
comparative advantage in new technology, business planning skills, and marketing skills all will 
be less likely to use cash only because of their ability to use their comparative advantages with 
specific pricing methods to sell calves.  
 80 
5.3.8 – Estimated Equation and Results 
To analyze this model, a censored normal regression model, also known as a Tobit 
model, was used, as the question was answered in percentage form (0% to 100%).  The 
regression is simply defined as (Greene, 2003): 
(16) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ = 𝜷𝜷𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 + 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊 
where i refers to producers, yi* is an unobservable variable linearly dependent on the explanatory 
variables, x, and ε is random error. When yi* is censored from above and below (upper and lower 
bounds) at the same time: 
(17) yi* =  �
𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊
∗ 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒚𝒚𝑳𝑳 < 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊 ∗ < 𝒚𝒚𝑼𝑼 
𝒚𝒚𝑳𝑳 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ ≤  𝒚𝒚𝑳𝑳
𝒚𝒚𝑳𝑳 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ ≥  𝒚𝒚𝑼𝑼   
 
Model estimation results are reported in Table 5.3. There were 208 upper bounds and 6 
lower bounds. 
Table 5.4 Cash-Only Pricing Method Parameter Estimates and Standard Error (UB = 100, 
LB = 0) 
Number of Upper Bounds: 208 
Number of Lower Bounds: 6 
Number of Observations Used:  252 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 362.586 68.621 
RPS -2.347*** 0.750 
AGE -0.785 0.827 
WAGES -0.185 0.352 
DAR -44.092 35.465 
ASSETS -0.008 0.011 
NCOWS -0.190** 0.089 
H -39.032 46.245 
Q20A -14.426 17.167 
Q20B 35.213* 20.899 
Q20H -52.482*** 19.134 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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The risk preference score, number of cows owned and comparative advantages in 
business planning skills and marketing skills all affected the use of a cash-only pricing method. 
Risk preference was significant at the 1% level. As a producer’s RPS increases, the predicted 
percent usage of cash-only pricing methods decreases by 2.3%; thus, producers with higher risk 
preference use less cash-only pricing.   When looking at the number of cows owned and use of 
marketing skills, as cow herd numbers and the use of marketing skills increase, the predicted 
percent usage of a cash-only pricing method decreases by 0.19% and 52%, respectively.  Having 
a comparative advantage in marketing skills negatively influences the probability that a producer 
uses a cash-only pricing method by decreasing the predicted percent usage of a cash-only pricing 
method by 52.5%. This is logical as producers who tend to use a cash-only pricing method will 
not utilize their marketing skills. The age of operator, off-farm income, debt-to-asset ratio, farm 
diversification, and comparative advantage in new technology were not statistically significant, 
therefore not affecting the usage of a cash-only pricing method. 
5.4 – Production Practices Affected by Risk Aversion: Model Specifications 
This section aims at analyzing models on production practices, such as herd size changes, 
and culling decisions and the effect of a producer’s risk aversion on them.  The way a producer 
manages their operation can be affected by their attitudinal risk averseness or risk preference. 
These production practices were chosen because they combine important decisions that 
producers face every year, and we can hypothesize what in these decisions are affected by risk 
aversion.  
5.4.1 – Herd Size Management Empirical Model 
One method of managing price risk is to reduce herd size when output prices are 
expected to decline and maintain or increase herd size when prices are expected to increase 
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(Murphy, 1991).  A survey question asked just that: “Looking forward over the next two years, 
how do you envision your cattle herd changing in size?” Respondents were given three options: 
1) expanding in size (39.5% of respondents), 2) reducing in size (14% of respondents), 3) 
remaining the same size (46.5% of respondents). The following model will determine if a 
producer’s risk preference affects their decisions to expand, reduce, or remain the same size, 
defined by: 
(18)  Q12A = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where Q12A is the question variable asking what decision the producer will make regarding herd 
size changes, and the other explanatory variables are the same as defined in Section 5.3.1.  
Risk preference is expected to affect the producer’s herd size, in that, as the more risk a 
producer prefers, the more probable they are to remain the same size or expand in size. On the 
contrary, if the producer is more risk averse, the more probable they are to reduce herd size.  As 
age of operator and debt-to-asset ratio increases, it is expected the more probable for the age to 
decline in years and for the ratio to reduce in size. As off-farm income, assets and comparative 
advantages in new technology, business planning, and marketing skills increase, the probability 
of a producer expanding herd size is expected to increase. Obviously, if the number of cows 
owned and farm diversification increases (becomes less diverse), it is expected that the 
probability to expand will increase, and vice versa. 
5.4.2 – Estimated Equation and Results 
An ordered logit model was used to estimate the parameters in equation (18) to determine 
how the different explanatory variable relates to the probability of the producer’s cow herd size 
changing in the next two years, which is reported in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Over the Next Two Years, 
How Do You Envision Your Cattle Herd Changing? (1 = Expanding in Size, 2 = Reducing 
in Size, 3 = Remaining the Same Size) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 1 2 3 
Intercept -1.2970 0.1607 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 -0.3432 0.2105 0.4075 0.1531 0.4394 
new technology = 0 Default 0.3279 0.1472 0.5249 
      
business planning skills = 1 -0.6671 0.0301 0.4874 0.1508 0.3618 
business planning skills = 0 Default 0.3279 0.1472 0.5249 
      
marketing skills = 1 -0.1564 0.6217 0.3633 0.1509 0.4858 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.3279 0.1472 0.5249 
      
   Marginal Probability (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0041 0.7257 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0010 
Age 0.0369 0.0044 -0.0081 -0.0011 0.0092 
Wages -0.0006 0.9126 0.0001 1.60E-05 -0.0001 
DAR -0.2416 0.6674 0.0533 0.0070 -0.0603 
Assets -2.05E-06 0.9903 4.52E-07 5.94E-08 -5.11E-07 
Ncows 0.0006 0.7065 -0.0001 -1.77E-05 0.0002 
H -0.3067 0.6605 0.0676 0.0089 -0.0765 
      
Log-Likelihood Function = -242.78081 Number of Observations Used = 252 
1Parameter estimates for "limit" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.6180 (<.0001). 
  
The business planning skills comparative advantage was the only binary variable to have 
statistical significance related to future farm size plans. Producers who indicated that they had 
this comparative advantage had a probability of 48.7% in expanding their cattle herd size, 15.1% 
in reducing their herd size, and 36.2% in remaining the same size. Operator age was the only 
statistically significant continuous variable. As the operator age increases, the probability of a 
producer expanding their herd size in the next two years decreases.  Interestingly, as the age of 
the operator increases, the probability a producer reducing their herd size also decreases. 
Conversely, as the age of the operator increases, the probability of a producer keeping their herd 
size the same in the next two years increases. Thus, producers older in age tend to keep their herd 
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size the same, whereas younger producers tend to either expand or reduce their herd size when 
looking forward in the next two years.   
5.4.3 – Culling Every Open Cow Empirical Model 
Producers may have a myriad of reasons for keeping an open cow. The survey gave 
producers five options as to what reason most described their decision to keep an open cow. 
These options were a) first time open, b) the quality of the cow, c) the value of the cow, d) had a 
good reproductive record, or e) I cull every open cow; no second chances.  As shown in Chapter 
3 in the survey results (Figure 3.4), the most widely held response, 34.3% of respondents, would 
give no second chances to an open cow to impregnate no matter the circumstance and cull every 
open cow. Producers have different reasons for keeping an open cow, but many choose to 
increase their risk of keeping the open cow for a certain reason (because of the value or quality 
of the cow), only to find out that the cow is not prolific. This model will help show the 
probability of producers culling every open cow with no second chance, to support their risk 
preference.  In order to determine how individual factors affected the probability of a producer 
culling every open cow, the following equation was estimated:   
(19)  Q9E= β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where Q9E is the question variable asking if the producer culls every open cow with no second 
chances, and the other explanatory variables are the same as defined in Section 5.3.1.  
It is expected that as a producer’s risk preference increases, the probability of culling 
every open cow decreases because keeping an open cow adds additional risk. It is expected that 
as age of operator, off-farm income, assets, number of cows owned, and the comparative 
advantages increase, the probability of culling every open cow increases. The older a producer, 
the more likely they are to cull an open cow because of their risk averseness. The more off-farm 
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income, assets, and number of cattle a producer possesses, the more likely they are to cull every 
open cow because losing one cow is not as vital to their operation.  Furthermore, as the debt-to-
asset ratio increases, the probability of culling every open cow increases; when a producer 
becomes more debt leveraged, they will sell more open cows in attempt to pay off debts.  
5.4.4 – Estimated Equation and Results 
Model estimation results are reported in Table 5.6, where a binary logit model was used 
to estimate the parameters in equation (19) to determine how the different explanatory variables 
relate to the probability of a producer culling an open cow with no second chance.  The 
probabilities associated with changes in the binary variables were calculated by holding all other 
variables at their average values, and analyzing at the default at 0, ceteris paribus, when changing 
one binary variable from 0 to 1.   
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Table 5.6 Binary Logit Estimates for the Probability of Culling Every Open Cow with No 
Second Chances (1 = Yes, Cull Every Open Cow; 0 = No, Do Not Always Cull Every Open 
Cow) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 0 1 
Intercept 0.3620 0.7287 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.6495 0.0355 0.6370 0.3630 
new technology = 0 Default 0.7706 0.2294 
     
business planning skills = 1 0.6000 0.0746 0.6484 0.3516 
business planning skills = 0 Default 0.7706 0.2294 
     
marketing skills = 1 0.3907 0.2635 0.6945 0.3055 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.7706 0.2294 
   
Marginal Probability           (at 
default = 0) 
RPS 0.0018 0.8911 0.0003 
Age -0.0360 0.0160 -0.0064 
Wages 0.0119 0.0449 0.0021 
DAR -0.0247 0.9686 -0.0044 
Assets 0.0000 0.9468 2.30E-06 
Ncows 0.0020 0.2371 0.0004 
H -0.0602 0.9430 -0.0106 
     
Number of Observations Used = 253    
Percent Concordant = 68.3%     
Percent Discordant = 31.4%         
 
Two of the comparative advantage binary variables were significant, new technology and 
business planning skills.   Producers who consider themselves to have a comparative advantage 
in new technology are 36.3% probable to cull all open cows, and those who consider themselves 
to have a comparative advantage in business planning skills are 35.2% probable to cull all open 
cows. Those that do not have a comparative advantage in these factors are 22.9% probable of 
culling every open cow with no second chance. The age of an operator and the off-farm income 
generated by the producer affected if producer’s culled an open cow every time by being 
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statistically significant.  As the age of the operator increases, the producer’s probability of 
culling all open cows decreases.  As more off-farm income is generated, the probability of that 
producer culling all open cows will increase. Thus, producers tend to cull all open cows if they 
are younger in age and possess more off-farm income.  RPS was not found to influence the 
culling practices among producers as it was not significant at the 10% level. Other continuous 
variables, debt-to-asset ratio, total assets, number of cows and farm diversification, did not 
influence culling practices among cattlemen.  
5.5 – Marketing Methods Specific to Retained Ownership Affected by Risk 
Aversion: Model Specifications 
 The third, and, last modeling group analyzed is marketing methods specific to retained 
ownership. By adopting marketing strategies, it shifts some of the price risk off of the individual 
to other groups (Murphy, 1991).  By retaining ownership of calves until feedlot stage or even 
until slaughter, the producer is taking on more price and production risks as cattle prices in the 
future may drop (unless a locked-in rate is established with a marketing agreement), and 
production risks can include sickness or death among calves in the feedlot. However, the return 
could (or could not) be greater in the end result, which causes a producer to weigh their risk 
options.   
5.5.1 – Marketing Decisions of Calves after Weaning Empirical Model 
As this section is looking at marketing methods, specifically retained ownership, the next 
model will analyze a survey question that particularly asked for the break-down of what 
producers do with their calves after weaning each year, with retained ownership being a choice. 
Choices were separated into steers and heifers, and producers had the choice to select 1=Never 
up to 5=Always. The three steers questions were: 1) sell steers after weaning, 2) background 
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steers and sell them, and 3) retain steers through finishing. The four heifer questions were: 1) 
retain heifers as replacements, 2) sell heifers after weaning, 3) background heifers then sell them, 
and 4) retain heifers through finishing.  
This first model will test how a producer’s risk preference affects the decision to market 
their calves using retained ownership management. To establish how individual factors affect the 
probability of a producer retaining ownership of calves, the following equation was estimated:   
(20)  Q3j= β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where Q3 is the question variable, j is for each of the seven answer choices, and the other 
explanatory variables are the same as defined in Section 5.3.1.   
5.5.2 – Estimated Equations and Interpretations 
Seven ordered-logit models were analyzed to represent each answer choice for the 
question. Binary and continuous parameter estimates are reported in Table 5.7 with variable 
significance notated by each parameter, and a specific table for the significant RPS variable 
parameter estimates (Table 5.8), to show how risk preference is affecting the exclusive post-
weaning marketing decisions.  
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Table 5.7 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, I 
Sell Steers After Weaning. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 1.8671 0.0432 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 -0.1008 0.7122 0.3863 0.1395 0.1522 0.1231 0.1989 
new technology = 0 Default 0.3627 0.1379 0.1550 0.1290 0.2154 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 1.0633 0.0010 0.1643 0.0929 0.1395 0.1604 0.4429 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.3627 0.1379 0.1550 0.1290 0.2154 
        
marketing skills = 1 -0.2981 0.3379 0.4340 0.1406 0.1449 0.1112 0.1693 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.3627 0.1379 0.1550 0.1290 0.2154 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS -0.0388 0.0015 0.0090 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0066 
Age -0.0048 0.7036 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008 
Wages -0.0073 0.1171 0.0017 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 
DAR 0.2214 0.6864 -0.0512 -0.0042 0.0054 0.0126 0.0374 
Assets -0.0004 0.0258 0.0001 7.60E-06 -9.76E-06 -2.29E-05 -0.0001 
Ncows -0.0007 0.6520 0.0002 1.39E-05 -1.79E-05 -4.20E-05 -0.0001 
H 1.3221 0.0595 -0.3056 -0.0249 0.0320 0.0751 0.2234 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -335.8571 Number of Observations Used = 235     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.5661 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.2075 (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  1.8562 (<.0001). 
 
Table 5.7 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose to sell steers 
after weaning.  The producer’s comparative advantage in business planning skills, RPS, total 
assets, and farm diversification were all statistically significant variables. As a producer’s 
comparative advantage in business planning skills increases, the probability of them often or 
always (responses of 4 and 5) is 60.3%.  The producer’s risk preference score variable showed a 
relationship in that the less risk averse a producer is, the less probable they were to sometimes, 
often, or always (responses of 3, 4 and 5 respectively) choose to sell steers after weaning.  
Conversely, the less risk averse a producer, the more probable they were to seldom or never 
(responses of 2 and 1 respectively) choose to sell steers after weaning. Therefore, producers who 
are risk averse tend to sell steers right after weaning instead of feeding them further. Next, a 
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producer’s total assets showed that as their assets owned increased, the less probable they were 
to always sell steers after weaning; and the more probable they were to seldom, sometimes, often 
or always sell steers after weaning. Lastly, the producer’s diversification of farm enterprises in 
terms of their overall income illustrated that as a farm becomes less diversified, the more 
probable the producer is to sometimes often or always sell steers; and the less probable the 
producer is to seldom or never sell steers after weaning. 
Table 5.8 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, I 
Background Steers Then Sell Them. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 1.7011 0.0526 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.2382 0.3621 0.2368 0.0991 0.1340 0.2212 0.3089 
new technology = 0 Default 0.2825 0.1084 0.1385 0.2102 0.2605 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 -0.3248 0.2557 0.3526 0.1177 0.1385 0.1883 0.2029 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.2825 0.1084 0.1385 0.2102 0.2605 
        
marketing skills = 
1 0.3663 0.2045 0.2144 0.0935 0.1302 0.2250 0.3369 
marketing skills = 
0 Default 0.2825 0.1084 0.1385 0.2102 0.2605 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0046 0.6728 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 
Age -0.0057 0.6364 0.0012 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0011 
Wages 0.0039 0.3782 -0.0008 -0.0001 -4.34E-05 0.0002 0.0008 
DAR -0.0295 0.9543 0.0060 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0057 
Assets -0.0001 0.5283 2.07E-05 3.61E-06 1.13E-06 -5.76E-06 -1.96E-05 
Ncows 0.0004 0.7751 -0.0001 -1.47E-05 -4.58E-06 2.34E-05 0.0001 
H -1.2727 0.0659 0.2579 0.0451 0.0141 -0.0719 -0.2452 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -373.01522 Number of Observations Used = 245     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.4888 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.0499 (<.0001)  
Limit 4:  1.976 (<.0001). 
 
Table 5.8 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose to 
background steers after weaning then sell them.  The only variable in the model that was 
statistically significant and affected those who background steers after weaning was the farm 
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diversification variable.  As a producer’s operation becomes less diversified in terms of 
enterprise income, the less probable a producer was to often or always background steers then 
sell them; and the more probable they are sometimes, seldom, or never background steers after 
weaning then sell them (31.7%). 
Table 5.9 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, I 
Retain Steers Through Finishing. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -1.3738 0.1899 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.5742 0.0648 0.6328 0.1617 0.0746 0.0533 0.0776 
new technology = 0 Default 0.7537 0.1191 0.0490 0.0330 0.0452 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 0.4391 0.194 0.6635 0.1521 0.0681 0.0478 0.0685 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.7537 0.1191 0.0490 0.0330 0.0452 
        
marketing skills = 1 0.6860 0.0447 0.6064 0.1692 0.0802 0.0582 0.086 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.7537 0.1191 0.0490 0.0330 0.0452 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0464 0.0006 -0.0086 0.0035 0.0018 0.0013 0.0020 
Age -0.0231 0.1139 0.0043 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0010 
Wages 0.0051 0.4321 -0.0010 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
DAR -0.6179 0.3425 0.1147 -0.0461 -0.0241 -0.0179 -0.0267 
Assets 0.0003 0.0528 -0.0001 2.69E-05 1.40E-05 1.04E-05 0.0000 
Ncows 0.0012 0.4749 -0.0002 0.0001 4.83E-05 3.59E-05 0.0001 
H -0.2888 0.7409 0.0536 -0.0216 -0.0112 -0.0083 -0.0125 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -226.58204 Number of Observations Used = 225     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.8078 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.3487  
(<.0001), Limit 4: 1.9311  (<.0001).  
 
Table 5.9 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose to retain 
steers through finishing.  Two comparative advantages, new technology and marketing skills, 
were statistically significant. When a producer has a comparative advantage in either of these 
aspects, the probability of them retaining steers through finishing increases. The producer’s risk 
preference and total assets also affected those to retain steers through finishing.  As a producer 
becomes less risk averse, the probability of them retaining ownership of steers decreases when 
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they never retain steers; however, the probability increases when they participate in any amount 
of retained ownership of steers through finishing. There is a similar relationship with the 
producer’s total assets. As their total assets increase, the probability of never retaining ownership 
decreases and the probability increases when they participate in any amount of retained 
ownership of steers through finishing. All other continuous variables did not affect the retained 
ownership of steers through finishing. 
Table 5.10 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, 
I Retain Heifers as Replacements. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 2.4881 0.0044 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.3216 0.2326 0.1397 0.0406 0.2588 0.2572 0.3037 
new technology = 0 Default 0.1830 0.0498 0.2864 0.2406 0.2402 
        
business planning skills = 
1 0.7269 0.0134 0.0977 0.0302 0.2150 0.2616 0.3954 
business planning skills = 
0 Default 0.1830 0.0498 0.2864 0.2406 0.2402 
        
marketing skills = 1 -0.4945 0.1068 0.2687 0.0636 0.3068 0.1993 0.1617 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.1830 0.0498 0.2864 0.2406 0.2402 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS -0.0069 0.4971 0.0010 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0013 
Age -0.0155 0.1962 0.0023 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0028 
Wages 0.0008 0.8634 -0.0001 -2.39E-05 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
DAR -0.9219 0.0895 0.1379 0.0268 0.0655 -0.0619 -0.1683 
Assets -2.67E-05 0.8708 3.99E-06 7.75E-07 1.89E-06 -1.79E-06 -4.87E-06 
Ncows 0.0024 0.1425 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 
H 0.1456 0.8231 -0.0218 -0.0042 -0.0103 0.0098 0.0266 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -353.77347 Number of Observations Used = 242      
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.3034 (0.0007), Limit 3:  1.5727 
(<.0001), Limit 4:  2.6474 (<.0001). 
 
Table 5.10 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose to retain 
heifers as replacements to their cowherd. Producer comparative advantages in business planning 
and marketing skills both affected retaining heifers as replacements. Producers with a 
comparative advantage in business planning skills are more probable to retain heifers as 
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replacements; whereas producers with a comparative advantage in marketing skills are less 
probable. Thus, producers who retain heifers back as replacements in their herd tend to have 
better business intuition than marketing skills. The producer’s debt-to-asset ratio was the only 
continuous variable to be statistically significant to retaining heifers.  It showed that as a 
producer’s DAR increases, the more probable they are to sometimes, seldom, or never retain 
heifers as replacements and the less probable they are to often or always keep heifers as 
replacements.  
Table 5.11 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, 
I Sell Heifers After Weaning. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 1.4546 0.1241 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 -0.1055 0.7102 0.3784 0.1509 0.2024 0.1154 0.1529 
new technology = 0 Default 0.3539 0.1491 0.2076 0.1224 0.1670 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 0.4736 0.1260 0.2544 0.1322 0.2180 0.1519 0.2436 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.3539 0.1491 0.2076 0.1224 0.1670 
        
marketing skills = 1 -0.3564 0.2771 0.4390 0.1521 0.1870 0.0988 0.1231 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.3539 0.1491 0.2076 0.1224 0.1670 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS -0.0169 0.1325 0.0039 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0023 
Age -0.0047 0.7180 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 
Wages -0.0040 0.3889 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0006 
DAR 0.0974 0.8639 -0.0223 -0.0021 0.0043 0.0065 0.0136 
Assets -0.0003 0.0513 0.0001 7.36E-06 
-1.53E-
05 
-2.30E-
05 
-4.80E-
05 
Ncows 0.0010 0.5186 -0.0002 -2.10E-05 4.36E-05 0.0001 0.0001 
H 0.3938 0.5905 -0.0901 -0.0084 0.0175 0.0262 0.0548 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -287.7909 Number of Observations Used = 251       
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.6138 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.4999 
(<.0001), Limit 4:  2.2086 (<.0001).  
 
Table 5.11 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose to sell 
heifers after weaning. None of the binary variables comparing comparative advantages affected 
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the selling of heifers after weaning. The only continuous variable to affect this was the 
producer’s total assets. A producer who has more assets is more probable to seldom or never sell 
heifers after weaning, whereas a producer with fewer assets is more probable to sometimes to 
always sell heifers after weaning. The remaining continuous variables were not statistically 
significant. 
Table 5.12 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, 
I Background Heifers, and Then Sell Them. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 2.1538 0.0209 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.0654 0.8059 0.2176 0.0952 0.2048 0.2427 0.2397 
new technology = 0 Default 0.2289 0.0981 0.2069 0.2381 0.2280 
        
business planning skills = 1 -0.3966 0.1888 0.3062 0.1132 0.2106 0.2042 0.1657 
business planning skills = 0 Default 0.2289 0.0981 0.2069 0.2381 0.2280 
        
marketing skills = 1 0.4572 0.1283 0.1582 0.0771 0.1851 0.2615 0.3181 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.2289 0.0981 0.2069 0.2381 0.2280 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0057 0.5968 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0010 
Age -0.0028 0.8255 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 
Wages 0.0004 0.9308 -0.0001 
-1.76E-
05 
-1.17E-
05 2.95E-05 0.0001 
DAR 0.1291 0.8081 -0.0228 -0.0056 -0.0037 0.0094 0.0227 
Assets -0.0001 0.4810 
2.10E-
05 5.19E-06 3.42E-06 
-8.67E-
06 
-2.09E-
05 
Ncows -0.0012 0.4146 0.0002 0.0001 3.45E-05 -0.0001 -0.0002 
H -1.6375 0.0238 0.2890 0.0714 0.0471 -0.1193 -0.2882 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -341.67248 Number of Observations Used = 222     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.4929 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.3504 
(<.0001), Limit 4:  2.4341 (<.0001).  
 
Table 5.12 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers who choose 
background their heifers, then sell them. Only one variable demonstrated to be statistically 
significant within the model, which was the farm diversification variable. This showed that 
producers whose farm is less diversified are more probable to never, seldom or sometimes 
background their heifers until they are ready to sell. Producers with a more diversified farm, in 
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terms of enterprise incomes, are more probable to often or always background their heifers until 
sale.  
Table 5.13 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Each Year After Weaning, 
I Retain Heifers Through Finishing. (1 = Never to 5 = Always) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -2.0831 0.0767 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.3978 0.2485 0.7039 0.1285 0.0628 0.0429 0.0620 
new technology = 0 Default 0.7796 0.1012 0.0462 0.0305 0.0425 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 0.7967 0.0279 0.6146 0.1545 0.0822 0.0590 0.0897 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.7796 0.1012 0.0462 0.0305 0.0425 
        
marketing skills = 1 0.4133 0.2753 0.7006 0.1295 0.0635 0.0434 0.0629 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.7796 0.1012 0.0462 0.0305 0.0425 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0477 0.0008 -0.0082 0.0032 0.0018 0.0013 0.0019 
Age -0.0178 0.2737 0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 
Wages 0.0069 0.3311 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
DAR -0.2981 0.6767 0.0512 -0.0199 -0.0111 -0.0080 -0.0121 
Assets 0.0003 0.0593 -0.0001 2.29E-05 1.28E-05 9.24E-06 1.40E-05 
Ncows 0.0004 0.8232 -0.0001 2.73E-05 1.53E-05 1.10E-05 1.67E-05 
H 0.2429 0.8164 -0.0417 0.0162 0.0091 0.0065 0.0099 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -187.78778 Number of Observations Used = 191     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parentheses: Limit 2:  0.7364 (<.0001), Limit 3:  1.278 (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  1.8502 (<.0001).  
 
Lastly in this section, Table 5.13 describes the explanatory variables to affect producers 
who choose to retain ownership of heifers through finishing. The one statistically significant 
comparative advantage was business planning skills. As producers encompass good business 
planning skills in their operation, the more probable they are to retain ownership of their heifers 
through finishing. The producer’s risk preference score statistically affects the retained 
ownership of heifers. The more risk averse a producer becomes, the more likely they are to never 
retain ownership of heifers. Thus, producers who are more risk preferring are more likely to take 
the chance at retaining ownership of their heifers through finishing. The last variable to 
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significantly affect the producers who choose to retain ownership of heifers through finishing 
was total assets. As we have seen in similar models, the asset variable’s sign coincides with the 
risk preference score.  A producer with fewer assets is less probable to retain ownership of heifer 
calves; whereas a producer with more total assets is more probable to retain ownership of heifer 
calves in some amount.  
5.5.3 – Results 
Looking at the producer’s risk preference score specifically, the three variables that were 
affected by RPS were producers who sell steers after weaning, and retain both steers and heifers 
through finishing. Producers who are risk averse tend to sell their steer calves after weaning, 
instead of participating in any type of marketing program or continuing the calves on feed until 
selling to the feed yard. Thus, producers who are more risk preferring tend to retain ownership of 
their steers and heifers through the finishing stages.  
Each post-weaning answer choice that a producer could choose from can be generalized 
further to show tendencies from the seven models (Tables 5.7 through 5.13).  Producers who sell 
steers after weaning tend to have a comparative advantage in business planning skills, lower total 
assets, and have a less diversified operation in terms of farm enterprise income. Those who 
background steers then sell them, tend to have a more diversified operation in terms of farm 
enterprise income. Also, producers who retain steers through finishing possess a comparative 
advantage in new technology and marketing skills, are more risk preferring individuals, and own 
more assets. Looking at heifer calf producers, those who retain heifers as replacements for their 
cowherd tend to have a comparative advantage in business planning skills, and a lower total 
debt-to-asset ratio.  Producers who sell heifers after weaning tend to have less total assets. Those 
who background heifers are more diversified in terms of their farm enterprise income. Lastly, 
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producers who retain heifers through finishing tend to have a comparative advantage in business 
planning skills, are more risk preferring and are more likely to have more total assets.  
5.6 – Summary  
 This chapter’s goal was to determine how management and marketing practices were 
affected by risk aversion and risk preference.  In order to model these practices as asked in the 
survey, empirical modeling frameworks were described specific to binary and ordered logit 
models, as well as including a Tobit, or censored normal regression, model. Three sections 
focused on producer’s financial soundness, production practices, and marketing methods, 
specific to retained ownership.  
Risk preference was found to affect producers who maintain financial/credit reserves, 
those who use cash-only pricing methods, individuals who participate in retained ownership 
production management programs, and post-weaning selling and marketing practices of selling 
steers after weaning and retaining ownership of steers and heifers through finishing. A producer 
who prefers more risk (less risk averse) is more likely to participate in retained ownership and 
similar production management programs. A producer who is more risk averse tends to view 
financial savings as more important, more likely to use cash-only pricing methods, and tends to 
sell steers right after weaning. 
The next chapter will determine what new production and marketing practices producers 
are willing to change or willing to risk to increase their profit margins.  
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CHAPTER 6 - Producers’ Willingness to Increase Net Returns 
6.1 – Introduction 
Any cow-calf producer may have an attitudinal risk preference whether it is more risk 
averse or more risk loving that affects their operating decisions, or, their operating decisions may 
affect what their risk preference may be. Either way, this chapter will look at what production 
and marketing practices cattlemen are willing to change or willing to risk to potentially increase 
their net returns. Section 6.2 will focus on how participation in value-added programs can 
increase returns and Section 6.3 will concentrate producer willingness to change calving seasons 
to potentially earn a greater net return.  
6.2 – Willingness to Participate in Value-Added Programs 
A producer’s willingness to participate in marketing programs can show their risk 
preference, as well as likeliness to increase the returns to their operation. An agreement question 
was asked in the survey which asked for the producer to respond to, “I would participate in a 
value-added program to increase returns to my operation”, with options from 1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree. The most common 
response was a “agree”, with a mean response of 3.77.  
6.2.1 – Value-Added Empirical Model 
The model for participating in a value-added program to increase returns is defined as 
(subscript i is dropped for notational convenience): 
(1) Q24F = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
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where participation in a value-added program (Q24F) is the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are as defined in Chapter 5. 
It is expected that the Risk Preference Score will affect the model by increasing in 
preference as the probability of participation in the value-added program increases. Other 
variables to affect the model are off-farm income, assets, number of cows owned, diversification 
index and comparative advantages in new technology, business planning and marketing skills 
because as they increase in value, the probability of participation in the value-added program 
increases. As age of operator and the debt-to-asset ratio increases, the probability of participation 
in the value added program is expected to decrease.  
6.2.2 – Estimated Equation and Results 
As similar to modeled equations in Chapter 5, an ordered logit model was used to 
estimate the parameters in equation (1) (as explained in equations (6) through (12) in Chapter 5) 
to determine how the different explanatory variables relate to the probability of the producer’s 
agreement to participation in value-added programs, and are reported in Table 6.1. Changes in 
probabilities associated with a one-unit change in each explanatory variable were calculated and 
are referred to as marginal probabilities, based on equation (12) from Chapter 5. The 
probabilities associated with changes in the binary variables were calculated by holding 
continuous variables at their average values and discrete variables at zero.  
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Table 6.1 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: I Would Participate in a 
Value-Added Program to Increase Returns to My Operation (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = 
Strongly Agree) 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate1 P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 2.2294 0.0347 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 0.2692 0.3233 0.0099 0.0334 0.2832 0.5047 0.1688 
new technology = 0 Default 0.0129 0.0430 0.3323 0.4775 0.1343 
        
business planning skills = 1 -0.0486 0.8749 0.0136 0.0450 0.3413 0.4714 0.1287 
business planning skills = 0 Default 0.0129 0.0430 0.3323 0.4775 0.1343 
        
marketing skills = 1 0.6388 0.0463 0.0069 0.0234 0.2206 0.5219 0.2271 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.0129 0.0430 0.3323 0.4775 0.1343 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS 0.0187 0.1054 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0035 0.0023 0.0022 
Age 0.0010 0.9363 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Wages 0.0004 0.9308 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DAR 0.1183 0.8255 -0.0015 -0.0047 -0.0218 0.0143 0.0137 
Assets 0.0001 0.4871 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ncows 0.0057 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 
H 2.0977 0.0026 -0.0268 -0.0839 -0.3875 0.2543 0.2439 
        
Log-Likelihood Function = -287.7909 Number of Observations Used = 251     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parenthesis: Limit 2:  1.5079 (0.0033), Limit 3:  3.879 (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  6.1978 (<.0001). 
 
Holding other factors constant, the probability that a producer having a comparative 
advantage in marketing skills, affecting the model to high degree (response of 4 and 5), was 
74.9%.  However, those who do not have a comparative advantage in marketing skills have a 
probability of 61.2% of having a response of 4 and higher. Comparative advantages in new 
technology and business planning skills were not related to willingness to participate in a value-
added program.   
Risk preference was the shown to not affect the model.  The only continuous variable to 
affect the model was the number of cows owned variable. As the number of cows owned by a 
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producer increases, the probability of participating in a value-added program increases (Figure 
6.1). A producer who owns 10 head of cattle has a total probability of 97.7% of participating in a 
value-added program, whereas a producer who owns 650 head of cattle has a total probability of 
99.9% of participating in a value-added program to increase returns. This figure shows a 
relationship between number of cows owned and expected probability of participating in a value-
added program which is increasing at a decreasing rate. Even though the variable is statistically 
significant, the impact is not very substantial. 
Figure 6.1 Number of Head Owned and Expected Probability of Participation in a Value-
Added Program to Increase Returns 
 
6.3 – Production and Marketing Decisions with Willingness to Change 
Many producers calve in a certain season, such as spring, fall, or year-round, because that 
is what they have always done, or else it works better with their farming operation. Others calve 
in a specific season so they can market their calves when prices are optimal. Producers were 
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given a survey question that set them up with the scenario where they typically market their 
spring-born calves at weaning in November. The question then asked how much higher would 
the expected net return need to be to convince them to feed their calves over the winter to sell in 
March.  This set up the respondent with risks to consider such as, death loss through the winter, 
higher feed costs, the hassle with feeding calves, which would essentially show their willingness 
to change production practices to earn a higher return. Five answer choices were: 1 = 5% higher, 
2 = 10% higher, 3 = 18% higher, 4 = 22% higher and 5 = would not consider carrying them over.  
The most common response was a net return of 10% higher, and the average was 3.05. 
6.3.1 – Expected Net Return Empirical Model 
The model for the expected net return anticipated by carrying over post-weaned calves to 
increase returns is defined as (subscript i is dropped for notational convenience): 
(2) Q11 = β0 + β1RPS + β2AGE + β3WAGES + β4DAR + β5ASSETS + β5NCOWS + β6H + 
β7Q20A + β8Q20B + β9Q20H + e 
where the willingness to carry over for a certain expected net return variable (Q11) is the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables are as defined in Chapter 5.  
Risk Preference is expected to affect the model in that, an increase in risk preference will 
increase the producer’s willingness to carry over. An increase in off-farm income, assets, number 
of cows owned, diversification index and comparative advantages in new technology, business 
planning and marketing skills are expected to affect the model as they increase in value, then the 
probability of willingness to carry over calves for a certain expected net return increases. As age 
of operator and the debt-to-asset ratio increases, the probability of willingness to carry over 
calves for a certain expected net return is expected to decrease.   
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6.3.2 – Estimated Equation and Results 
Again, an ordered logit model was used to estimate the parameters in equation (2) to 
determine how the different explanatory variables relate to the probability of the producer’s 
willingness to carry over calves for a certain expected net return, and are reported in Table 6.2. 
Changes in probabilities associated with a one-unit change in each explanatory variable were 
calculated and are referred to as marginal probabilities, based on equation (12) from Chapter 5. 
The probabilities associated with changes in the binary variables were calculated by holding 
continuous variables at their average values and discrete variables at zero.  
Table 6.2 Ordered Logit Estimates for Response to Statement: Suppose You Typically 
Market Spring-Born Calves at Weaning in November. How Much Higher Would the 
Expected Net Return Need to be to Convince You to Retain and Feed Calves Over to Sell in 
March? 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate1 P-Value 
5% 
Higher 
10% 
Higher 
18% 
Higher 
22% 
Higher 
Would not 
consider 
carrying 
them over 
Intercept 4.5866 <.0001 Probabilities 
new technology = 1 -0.7679 0.0062 0.0372 0.4991 0.3064 0.0891 0.0683 
new technology = 0 Default 0.0176 0.3316 0.3639 0.1505 0.1364 
        
business planning 
skills = 1 0.1893 0.5197 0.0146 0.2929 0.3653 0.1669 0.1603 
business planning 
skills = 0 Default 0.0176 0.3316 0.3639 0.1505 0.1364 
        
marketing skills = 1 0.0109 0.9716 0.0174 0.3293 0.3611 0.1515 0.1377 
marketing skills = 0 Default 0.0176 0.3316 0.3639 0.1505 0.1364 
        
   Marginal Probabilities (at default = 0) 
RPS -0.0139 0.1952 0.0002 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0016 
Age 0.0079 0.5135 -0.0001 -0.0017 0.0002 0.0007 0.0009 
Wages -0.0014 0.7794 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 
DAR -0.9208 0.0860 0.0159 0.1933 -0.0209 -0.0799 -0.1085 
Assets -0.0001 0.4270 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ncows -0.0020 0.1977 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 
H 0.0202 0.9767 -0.0003 -0.0042 0.0005 0.0018 0.0024 
Log-Likelihood Function = -311.22690 Number of Observations Used = 237     
1Parameter estimates for "limits" with p-values in parenthesis: Limit 2: 3.3994 (<.0001), Limit 3:  4.9323  (<.0001), 
Limit 4:  5.8675 (<.0001). 
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Having a comparative advantage in new technology is related to the model, holding other 
factors constant, in that, as the comparative advantage increases, the probability that a producer 
is willing to carry over calves for a certain expected net return was largest for a 10% higher net 
return at 49.9%. The probability of an 18% higher net return was 30.6%; the probability of a 
22% higher net return was 8.9%; the probability of a 5% higher net return was 3.7%; and, the 
probability of not carrying them over was 6.8%, for possessing a comparative advantage in new 
technology. Comparative advantages in business planning and marketing skills were not related 
to willingness.  
Risk preference was not related to the model. The debt-to-asset ratio was the only 
continuous variable to affect the model. The probability of a producer’s willingness to carry over 
calves for a certain expected net return decreases as the debt-to-asset ratio of that producer 
increases. So, as a producer’s debt-to-asset ratio because larger (closer to 1), the probability of 
the producer being willing to carry over calves for a certain expected net return decreases (Figure 
6.2). This figure shows a relationship between debts to assets and expected probability of 
willingness to carry over calves for a certain expected net return which is slightly non-linear at a 
decreasing rate. 
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Figure 6.2 Debt-to-Asset Ratio and Expected Probability of Willingness to Carry Over 
Calves to Increase Returns 
  
 
 
6.4 – Summary 
The goal of this chapter is to show what production and marketing practices producers 
are willing to change to increase returns to their operations.  First, we found that producers who 
would participate in value-added programs to increase returns to their operation have a 
comparative advantage in marketing skills, own more head of cattle, and are less diversified in 
term of their farm incomes (beef income is a larger percentage of their income than crops or 
other livestock). Second, we found that producers on average are willing to risk carrying over 
their calves to market in spring for an expected 10% higher net return. Producers who are willing 
to carry over their calves for a certain expected net return have a comparative advantage in new 
technology and have low debt-to-asset ratios (less debt than assets).  
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CHAPTER 7 - Conclusions & Implications 
7.1 – Introduction  
This chapter includes a brief synopsis of the research and results presented and discussed 
in the previous six chapters. This study evaluated means of managing production risk related to 
operating decisions, as well as looking at the producer’s operating decisions and how they are 
related to their risk preference. Risk preference, which we defined as looking at risk as an 
opportunity for increased net returns, was the sole type of risk considered in the analysis. The 
main objective of this research was to quantify cow-calf producers’ risk perceptions and 
associated determinants.  Specific research objectives were: 
1. Determine cow-calf producer risk preferences based on a set of risk aversion 
measurements.  
2. Determine how operating decisions producers are making based on their production 
and marketing practices specific to calf-timing, health management, feeding and 
grazing, breeding, culling, and selling are related to their risk aversion. 
3. Determine how risk aversion affects producer management and marketing practices.  
4. Identify what new production and marketing practices producers are willing to 
change or willing to risk to increase their profit margins. 
As we began this research with the quote, “If your cow-calf operation is free of failures, 
you’re not taking enough risks to potentially increase returns”, operators who are not fully 
utilizing their production and marketing potential for calves, can take advantage of ways, such as 
retaining ownership, to increase their returns. The following sections will conclude these 
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potentials and bring to a close what preferences producers are operating at, describe each 
objective and report significant results. 
 
7.2 – Cow-Calf Producer Risk Preference 
The producer’s risk preference was quantified as a “score” (RPS) variable by combining 
five questions, created based on previous literature to merge certain dimensions of risk. The 
purpose of this score was for its use to compare to other attitudinal and production questions, as 
well as whole farm data. The risk questions were formatted to ask producers for their preference 
of risk-taking practices and viewing risk as an opportunity. The RPS was arbitrarily categorized 
in order to compare producers in basic terms relative to other respondents, a method researched 
and described fully in Chapter 4.   
We found that when split into 20 percent size-categories relative to the range of RPS, 
36% of Kansas producers possess a low risk preference (very risk averse), 49.6% possess a 
below average risk preference (somewhat risk averse), 12.1% possess an average/moderate risk 
preference (neutral risk partiality), 2.2% possess an above average risk preference (somewhat 
risk preferring), and 0.4% possess a high risk preference (very risk preferring). According to the 
categorization scheme developed, nearly 86% of Kansas cow-calf producer survey respondents 
are risk averse and only 2.6% are risk tolerant.   
7.3 – Operating Decisions Related to Risk Aversion 
It is difficult to identify whether producer operating decisions are driven by their personal 
risk preference, or if their risk preference is based on their operating decisions, and this study did 
not test which of these prevail.  Quite likely there is bi-directional causality between risk 
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aversion and operation characteristics.   In fact, this study illustrated how operating decisions are 
related to risk aversion, and risk aversion is related to operating decisions.  
 Factors that were found to influence risk aversion were socioeconomic factors such as 
age, off-farm income, debt-to-asset ratio, farm size, and number of cows owned, as well as 
comparative advantages of producers: use and analysis of new technology, business planning 
skills, and marketing skills. Age was related to risk preference in that, as an operator gets older, 
their risk preference decreases. This coincides with research by Grable and Lytton (1999).  An 
operator’s assets and number of cows owned affect their risk preference positively with the more 
assets and cows producers own, the larger is their risk preferences.  Producers who consider 
themselves to have a comparative advantage in use and analysis of new technology have a higher 
preference for risk.  
In order to determine operating factors that affect a producer’s risk preference, sensitivity 
analysis was run on financial strength of the producer, production practices, and marketing 
methods specific to retained ownership, where independent variables were revealed to have an 
effect on RPS. Producers maintaining financial/credit reserves tend to have a smaller preference 
for risk, producers who participate in value-added programs to increase returns in their operation 
have higher tolerance for risk, and producers who are highly concerned with disease prevention 
tend to be more risk averse. In terms of reasons to retain ownership, producers who retain 
ownership to receive performance data have more preference for risk, whereas producers who 
retain ownership to receive carcass data have less preference for risk. Producers who retain 
ownership to receive a return for genetic improvement for value-added investments have a larger 
preference for risk. 
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7.4 – Risk Aversion Related to Operating Decisions 
Several binary and ordered logit models were used to determine how risk aversion was 
related to cow-calf producer operating decisions. Three sections focused on producer’s financial 
reserves, production practices, and marketing methods specific to retained ownership.  Analysis 
of producer financial credit reserves revealed that the probability of a producer maintaining 
credit reserves is likely to increase as risk aversion increases. Additionally, the higher the 
producer’s risk preference, the less likely they are to use cash-only pricing methods. Neither of 
the two models used to look at production practices were related to risk preference. Results of 
analysis of marketing methods specific to retained ownership were that risk preference was 
higher for individuals that participated in retained ownership production management programs. 
When looking at post-weaning selling and marketing practices, risk preference was higher for 
producers who retain ownership of steers and heifers through finishing, than those who sell 
steers after weaning. 
7.5 – Production and Marketing 
After looking at producers’ preferences of risk related to operating decisions and 
operating decisions related to risk preference, more research was conducted to identify what 
production and marketing practices producers were willing to change or willing to risk to 
increase their returns. Two more logit models were analyzed on producer participation in value-
added programs to increase returns, and producer willingness to carry over their fall-weaned 
calves to market in spring for a certain expected net return.  
Producers who would participate in value-added programs to increase returns to their 
operation have a comparative advantage in marketing skills, own more cattle, and are less 
diversified in terms of their farm incomes (beef income is a larger percentage of their income 
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than crops or other livestock). This model was not related to risk preference. Producers, on 
average, are willing to risk carrying over their calves to market in spring for an expected 10% 
higher net return. Additionally, producers who are willing to carry over their calves for a certain 
expected net return have a comparative advantage in new technology and have low debt-to-asset 
ratios. This model was also not related to risk preference. 
The study demonstrated a potential bi-directional causality of how operating decisions 
are related to risk aversion, and how risk aversion is related to operating decisions. When 
looking at operating decisions that were related to risk preferences, we found that older 
producers and those who have less assets and smaller cow herd are more risk averse, compared 
to younger producers and those with more assets who are more risk tolerant. Additionally, those 
with a comparative advantage in use and analysis of new technology have a higher preference for 
risk. Conversely, looking at the risk preferences that were related to operating decisions, risk 
preference was found to affect producers who maintain financial/credit reserves, those who use 
cash-only pricing methods, individuals who participate in retained ownership production 
management programs, and post-weaning selling and marketing practices of selling steers after 
weaning and retaining ownership of steers and heifers through finishing.  
A major finding in this research is that risk aversion does determine a producers’ 
willingness to retain ownership. We found that in terms of reasons to retain ownership, producers 
who retain ownership to receive performance data or to receive a return for genetic improvement 
for value-added investments have a larger preference for risk. When looking at post-weaning 
selling and marketing practices, risk preference was higher for producers who retain ownership 
of steers and heifers through finishing, than those who take the less risky option of selling steers 
directly after weaning. Thus, producers who choose to start retaining ownership of their calves 
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through finishing are considered as more risk preferring, and producers who already retain 
ownership of their calves have a higher preference for risk. 
Essentially, a goal of this project was to research and analyze how cow-calf producers 
view their operating decisions compared to their risk preference as an opportunity associated to 
profit margins.  We found that producers who use new forms of technology, use pricing methods 
besides cash only (like futures) and retain ownership of steers and heifers through finishing, all 
have a higher preference for risk. These three forms of management give the producer the 
potential to market their cattle better and add value to their product.  Not always will these three 
allow a producer to gain larger profit margins, but the opportunity associated with these higher 
risk practices can be an opportunity which is relevant to earnings, in which Kansas cattlemen can 
view as a possible practice to include in their operation.  
7.6 –Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations of this study included a limited data set of only Kansas producers in the 
KFMA, where opening up this survey to all producers in the state, or even nationally, could 
provide for a larger, more complete set of data. The response rate was higher than expected 
(40%), but an even higher response rate could essentially enhance the study.  Of course, these 
generalizations only take a conditional view of the respondents to the survey, and not all KFMA 
members, or even all Kansas cattlemen. Furthermore, measuring risk aversion is not an exact 
science and the questions used in this study serve as only a proxy for measuring this complex 
concept.  Additionally, limitations could show multicollinearity issues with including RPS as 
both an endogenous and exogenous variable, but this issue did not affect overall results on risk 
preference. 
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Future research could focus on utilizing more of the whole farm data set from KFMA 
members, along with survey questions to research additional reasons for specific risk 
preferences.  Furthermore, time series data could be used to show the change in producer’s risk 
preference over a certain time period. It would be interesting to research why so many producers 
are so risk averse. Is it because their fathers, or persons involved in their training, were very risk 
averse, or have they had an experience where they risked a lot and the outcome was traumatic, or 
are they just risk averse because they do not know how to effectively market their cattle to earn 
more? These questions may be answered within the survey questions already asked, or a follow-
up study in a few years could determine changes in producer risk preferences, production, and 
marketing practices and routines willing to change or risk to potentially increase their net returns.  
More specific questions could be asked about why their risk preference/averseness is the way it 
is, and if any education, either from college or extension workshops, contributed to their 
preference. These additions to the research could allow for extension educators to provide more 
materials specific to producers’ wants and needs in terms of risk preferences. 
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Appendix A - Cow-Calf Risk Management Survey 
 
 
KANSAS FARM MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 
 
Your Farm   -   Your Information   -   Your Decision 
 
 
 
 
Cow-Calf Risk 
Management Survey 
 
For more information: 
Kelsey Frasier 
Graduate Research Assistant 
Department of Agricultural Economics  
Kansas State University 
Phone: (785)532-6709 
E-Mail: kfrasier@agecon.ksu.edu 
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1. Approximately what percentage of your cows do you calve out in spring and fall? 
(Total should equal 100%). 
                        _______% Spring (Jan to June)    _______% Fall (July to Dec)  
 
2. What type of production management programs do you participate in? Circle all 
that apply. 
a. Retained Ownership 
b. Certified Feeder Cattle (Red Angus Feeder Calf Certification Program, Linmark, 
etc.) 
c. Product Specified Feeder Cattle (i.e. AngusSource®, Hereford Verified, etc.) 
d. Pasture to Plate Alliances 
e. Other:______________________________________________ 
 
3. Each year after weaning, what do you do with your calves? Please circle response for 
each question. 
Steers: Always Often Sometimes Seldom Never 
Sell steers after weaning 5 4 3 2 1 
Background steers; sell them 5 4 3 2 1 
Retain steers through finishing 5 4 3 2 1 
Heifers:      
Retain heifers as replacements 5 4 3 2 1 
Sell heifers after weaning 5 4 3 2 1 
Background heifers; sell them 5 4 3 2 1 
Retain heifers through finishing 5 4 3 2 1 
 
4. Of calves you sell annually, what percentage of each marketing method do you 
typically use? 
_____% Direct Marketing 
_____% Local Auction Barn – normal sale 
_____% Local Auction Barn – special graded sale 
_____% Video Auction (i.e. Superior Livestock Auction, web listings, etc.) 
_____ % Other: ____________________________________________ 
100% = Total 
 
The purpose of this survey is to obtain information that will assist in the development of programs and 
timely information to enhance your risk management decisions and improve profitability in your cattle 
operation. Your individual responses are anonymous and will be treated with complete confidentiality. 
Results will be reported only in summary form. Thank you for your time and assistance. Estimated time of 
completion: 15 minutes. 
For questions, please contact Kelsey Frasier, Graduate Research Assistant,  
Kansas State University, (785)410-3024 or email at kfrasier@agecon.ksu.edu. 
Please return completed survey by June 10 in enclosed postage paid envelope or complete web 
version at https://surveys.ksu.edu/TS?offeringId=129946 . 
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5.   What is your typical pricing method you use for your calves you sell annually? 
_____% Forward Contracting or Marketing Agreement 
_____% Futures Hedging 
_____% Futures Options 
_____% Cash only  
_____% Other: _____________________________________________ 
100% = Total 
 
6. If you DO retain ownership, why do you? Please check all that apply. 
_____I see the risk worthwhile to earn the potential of more $/hd 
_____I receive performance data while calves are on feed (i.e. rate of gain, average 
weights, etc.) 
_____I receive carcass data information 
_____I get a return for genetic improvements or value-added investments 
_____Other:_________________________________________________ 
 
7. If you DON’T retain ownership, why don’t you? Please check all that apply. 
_____I don’t receive additional profit than selling after weaning 
_____I don’t need to receive back carcass data 
_____I don’t want to take the risk involved with owning while in feedlot 
_____I want to receive revenue earlier than waiting until calves are finished 
_____I don't have a relationship established with a feedlot 
_____Other:_________________________________________________ 
 
8. If a cow does not settle/comes up open, which decision do you typically make? 
a. Cull immediately and sell 
b. Feed out and send to packing house 
c. Give her one more chance to get bred next year 
d. Defer to alternative calving season herd (i.e., if she was supposed to calve spring, 
breed to have her calve in fall or vice versa) 
 
9. A reason I would keep an open cow would be: 
a. First time open 
b. The quality of the cow (i.e. registered, good genetics) 
c. The value of the cow (i.e. how much money has been put into her: quality, 
vaccinations or otherwise) 
d. Had a good reproductive record (i.e. raised healthy calves in the past) 
e. I cull every open cow; no second chances 
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10. Please rank the input costs below relative to their effect on your operation:  
(1 being largest cost to 8 being lowest cost) 
_____Animal health costs 
_____Cost of breeding stock 
_____Feed costs (corn, hay, mineral, etc.) 
_____Fuel 
_____Interest 
_____Labor 
_____Maintenance costs  
_____Pasture rent or ownership costs 
 
11. Suppose you typically market your spring-born calves at weaning in November. 
How much higher would the expected net return need to be to convince you to 
retain and feed your calves over to sell in March?  
a. 5% higher 
b. 10% higher 
c. 18% higher 
d. 22% higher 
e. Would not consider carrying them over 
 
12. Looking forward over the next two years, how do you envision your cattle herd and 
crop acreage
                          Cattle Herd      Crop Acreage 
 changing? Please “X” one for each category. 
 
Expanding in size   
Reducing in size   
Remaining the same size   
 
13. What percent of your herd do you artificially inseminate (A.I.)? Please circle one. 
 
0%     10-40%    40-70%   
 
70-100% 
14. Of cows you A.I., what percentage typically end up bred from the A.I.? Please circle 
one. 
 
0%      10-40%    40-70%   
 
70-100% 
15. In your farm/ranch management, how would your neighbors describe your risk 
taking behavior? 
a. A risk avoider 
b. Cautious 
c. Willing to take risks after adequate research 
d. A real gambler 
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16. You can sell your calves at different production stages.  If given the following 
options, which would you choose? 
a. Sell at weaning 
b. Retain for two months post weaning with a: 
30% chance of netting an additional $5/hd, 10% chance of losing 
$10/hd, or 60% chance of netting no additional $/hd 
c. Retain through finishing with a: 
30% chance of netting an additional $40/hd, 15% chance of losing 
$50/hd, or 55% chance of netting no additional $/hd 
 
17. Given the best and worst case potential outcomes from marketing your weaned 
calves, which net return/loss prospect would you most prefer from the four listed 
below?  
a. $20/calf return best case; $0/calf loss worst case 
b. $35/calf return best case; $20/calf loss worst case 
c. $65/calf return best case; $35/calf loss worst case 
d. $100/calf return best case; $75/calf loss worst case 
 
18. Your trusted friend is putting together investors to fund a new innovative business 
venture. The venture could pay back more than 50 times the investment if 
successful. If the venture is a bust, the entire investment is worthless. Your friend 
estimates the chance of success is 20%. How much would you invest? 
a. Nothing 
b. $1,000 
c. $10,000 
d. $50,000 
e. $100,000 
f. More than $100,000 
 
19. If your trusted friend and banker each conclude that success of the venture in the 
above question is 60% instead of 20%, how much would you invest? 
a. Nothing 
b. $1,000 
c. $10,000 
d. $50,000 
e. $100,000 
f. More than $100,000 
 
20. Which factors below do you consider your comparative advantages? Please “X” up 
to five options. 
_____Analysis and use of new technology 
_____Business planning skills (transition planning, business structure, alliances, etc.) 
_____Cattle genetics 
_____High quality land/pasture 
_____Loan and interest rate management 
_____Low cost 
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_____Machinery management 
_____Marketing skills 
_____Personnel management 
_____Production skills (forage yields, calving rates, weaning weights, etc.) 
 
21. Please rate these general risk factors by their level of importance to your cow 
operation. Please circle the best response. 
 Very 
Concerned Concerned Neutral 
Low 
Concern 
Not 
Concerned 
Drought 5 4 3 2 1 
Unexpectedly low cattle prices 5 4 3 2 1 
High replacement heifer prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Variation in non-feed input 
prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Changes in gov’t environmental 
programs 5 4 3 2 1 
Storms (snow, ice, lightening, 
etc.) 5 4 3 2 1 
Changes in government farm 
programs 5 4 3 2 1 
High hay/forage prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Animal Disease 5 4 3 2 1 
High land prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Rented pasture availability 5 4 3 2 1 
Labor availability 5 4 3 2 1 
High price of labor 5 4 3 2 1 
Credit availability 5 4 3 2 1 
High interest rates 5 4 3 2 1 
 
22. Rank these risk factors in terms of importance that each affects your ranch/farm 
income. Please circle the best response. 
 Very 
Important Important Neutral 
Low  
Importance 
Not 
Important 
Maintaining animal health 5 4 3 2 1 
Being a low-cost producer 5 4 3 2 1 
Receiving premiums for calves sold 5 4 3 2 1 
Maintaining financial/credit reserves 5 4 3 2 1 
Retaining calves for market timing 5 4 3 2 1 
Specializing in one phase of cattle 
production 5 4 3 2 1 
Diversifying in numerous ranch/farm 
enterprises 5 4 3 2 1 
Forward contracting futures & options 5 4 3 2 1 
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23. How do you manage farm/ranch income volatility? Please “X” all that apply. 
_____Purchase insurance 
_____Off-farm income 
_____Saving funds in good years 
_____Selling more cull cows during hard times and retaining more at other times 
_____Utilizing marketing methods to sell calves 
24. Please circle the best response for each statement. 
 Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Economically, I view my cow-calf herd as the most 
important part of overall farm income SA A N D SD 
Recent economic instability has focused my attention 
on more careful financial management in my operation SA A N D SD 
Recent economic instability has focused my attention 
on more time spent on marketing in my operation SA A N D SD 
Recent economic instability has focused my attention 
on more intensive herd management in my operation SA A N D SD 
Individually identifying cattle is crucial to my operation 
and marketing of my cattle SA A N D SD 
I would participate in a value-added program to 
increase returns to my operation SA A N D SD 
Disease prevention is important in my cattle herd SA A N D SD 
I consult with my veterinarian regularly to develop and 
implement a whole-herd health program SA A N D SD 
I inspect my herd at least twice weekly SA A N D SD 
Body condition scoring of cows is important SA A N D SD 
 
25. Do you use your pasture ground for reasons other than grazing your personal herd? 
Please circle all that apply. 
a. Agritourism 
b. Energy development (oil, gas or wind) 
c. Hunting 
d. Leased out to another herd 
e. Recreation 
f. Other, please list:__________________ 
g. None 
 
26. Do you own a computer?    ______ Yes   ______ No 
 
27. Do you have Internet access?   ______ Yes   ______ No 
 
28. How often do you access the Internet? 
a. Daily 
b. Weekly 
c. Monthly 
d. Less often  
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Thank you for your time! Your assistance is greatly appreciated.   
For questions, please contact Kelsey Frasier, Graduate Research Assistant, Kansas State 
University, 
(785) 410-3024 or email at kfrasier@agecon.ksu.edu. 
 
Please return completed survey in enclosed postage paid envelope or complete web version 
at https://surveys.ksu.edu/TS?offeringId=129946
  
 . 
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Appendix B - Association & County Data 
 
